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**ANARCHISM,
TROTSKYISM,
MAOISM**

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THE GENERAL AND THE PARTICULAR

Throughout its history the working-class movement has constantly had to contend with a curious social phenomenon known as petty-bourgeois revolutionariness, which had emerged before the proletariat itself took shape, because historically the petty bourgeoisie antedates the working class.

The roots of petty-bourgeois revolutionariness differ from country to country, because in each the disintegration of the petty-commodity economy ran a peculiar national course in a specific historical situation. Whereas in the Romance countries of Western Europe it was above all the crumbling economy of the urban artisans that served as the social soil for the diverse manifestations of petty-bourgeois revolutionariness, in Russia it was mainly the peasant economy burdened with the survivals of serfdom. In countries under colonial or national oppression, petty-bourgeois revolutionariness springs from an underprivileged population and naturally develops into a drive for national liberation. Everywhere, some sections of the intelligentsia serve as a breeding ground for petty-bourgeois revolutionariness.

The struggle of the petty bourgeoisie for its rights has had a progressive part to play on many occasions. Marxists put a high value on the activity of the Jacobins in France, the contribution made by the revolutionary Narodniks to the li-

beration movement in Russia, Sun Yat-sen's role in developing the anti-imperialist struggle in China, and the achievements of the Cuban revolutionary democrat José Martí. Even today, where there is no working class, the revolutionary petty-bourgeoisie is capable of showing the nation a progressive way of development. Revolutionary democrats, voicing the interests of the labouring peasants, semi-proletarian elements and urban sections of the petty bourgeoisie have played an outstanding role in winning national independence in many countries. These revolutionary democratic forces have succeeded in taking some states along the non-capitalist way and carrying out important social reforms. The revolutionary democrats may be inconsistent and confused about many of their ideas, but Marxists consider it their duty to help them because they are sure that the logic and the experience of the class struggle will gradually help honest revolutionary democratic leaders to shed many of their illusions.

The International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in 1969 stressed that in order to solve the tasks of national and social development in the liberated countries and give an effective rebuff to the designs of neocapitalism it was important to "raise the activity of the people, enhance the role of the proletariat and the peasants, rally working youth, students, intellectuals, urban middle strata and democratic army circles—all patriotic and progressive forces."¹ In working to involve in the struggle all the social sections suffering from imperialism, the

¹ *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties*, Moscow, 1969, p. 29.

Communists have been translating into practice Lenin's idea of establishing a united anti-imperialist front, an idea he first expressed in his theses on the national and colonial questions, which was adopted by the Second Congress of the Comintern in 1920, and elaborated and concretised by the Fourth Congress of the Comintern two years later.

While recognising that the petty bourgeoisie is capable of playing a big revolutionary part, the Communists take account of the fact that the objective possibilities open to petty-bourgeois revolutionariness are limited by the conditions of the time. As the working class develops into the most consistent revolutionary force in modern society capable of rallying all those who are oppressed by capitalism, and especially as socialism is transformed into an international force, the petty-bourgeois revolutionaries' positive role is the more pronounced the closer they are to the proletariat as its allies.

However, alongside its militant democratism, ardent love of freedom, and resolute struggle for national independence, the petty-bourgeoisie also breeds a faint-hearted reformism and what Lenin ironically called petty-bourgeois revolutionariness, whose boastful, terrible, exaggerated catchwords amount to no more than empty talk.

The diversity of types in the patchwork of the petty-commodity economy works in various ways to give the petty bourgeoisie a patchy ideology and makes its revolutionarism inconsistent. Being incapable of producing an objective scientific theory explaining the processes of social development, the petty bourgeoisie produces a fancy quilt of ideological conceptions, eclectically borrowing

various ideas taken at random from various bourgeois doctrines, and also from the Marxist ideology of the proletariat, when it has emerged.

But for all this casting about, frequently bringing together ideas which are diametrically opposite, petty-bourgeois revolutionariness has some common features, whatever its form and historical period. These features were laid bare by Marx, Engels and Lenin, and since then life has been providing fresh evidence of the great accuracy of their analysis.

The principal feature of any type of pseudo-revolutionarism is extreme subjectivism, refusal to reckon with any objective laws of social development, and blind faith in the miraculous power of a revolutionary explosion and direct instant action, irrespective of the socio-political situation. Hence the tactics of impetuous gambles or, as Lenin remarked, a passive waiting for the "‘great days’ along with an inability to muster the forces which create great events."¹ Whereas proletarian revolutionarism is a blend of the cool scientific approach in analysing the objective state of affairs and the most resolute recognition of the importance of the revolutionary energy and initiative of the masses, and also of parties and individuals capable of giving correct expression to the needs of social development,² petty-bourgeois revolutionariness springs from feelings, an emotional onrush.

In his *"Left-Wing" Communism—an Infantile Disorder* Lenin wrote: "The instability of such revolutionism, its barrenness, and its tendency to

¹ Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 16, p. 349.

² See Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 13, p. 36.

turn rapidly into submission, apathy, phantasms, and even a frenzied infatuation with one bourgeois fad or another—all this is common knowledge.”¹ The petty bourgeois “driven to frenzy” will easily jump to extreme revolutionism, but is incapable of displaying self-restraint, smooth organisation, discipline and steadfastness.

Before the proletarian struggle gained in strength and when it was still dominated by the forms peculiar to the early stages of the movement, anarchism was the fullest expression of the numerous varieties of petty-bourgeois revolutionariness. Lenin said it was “bourgeois philosophy turned inside out”.² Lenin remarked that the anarchists’ individualistic views and ideals were diametrically opposite to socialism for they did not face the future of the bourgeois system but its past, the domination of blind chance over the scattered, lone petty producer. “Anarchism is a product of *despair*. The psychology of the unsettled intellectual or the vagabond and not of the proletarian.”³

While the working-class movement was taking its first steps, the anarchists either ignored it or tried to cooperate with workers’ organisations so as to bend them to their own purpose. But as Marxist views gradually gained ever wider recognition, the hostility of anarchism to proletarian ideology became increasingly pronounced.

The anarchists opposed the organised forms of working-class struggle in general, and its political struggle in particular, and denied the state as

¹ Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 31, p. 32.

² Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 10, p. 73.

³ Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 5, p. 327.

such, including the proletarian dictatorship, provoking the workers into ungovernable violent action. They accused working-class leaders of careerism, charging that they had forgotten the interests of the revolution and "were pursuing the worst bourgeois policies."

The anarchists carried on splitting activities against the First International, and set up their own secret "Socialist Democratic Alliance," declaring it to be open for membership to those who "with brains, energy, honesty and secrecy combine revolutionary passion, those who have the devil in them."

Since they ignored the laws of social and economic development, they were unable to come up with any true analysis of objective reality and to bring out the social forces which could blaze the trail into the future. The anarchists believed that the future could be arranged at will, and that any means would serve to achieve their aims. Some extremists among the anarchists believed that poison, the dagger and the noose were the weapons of the true revolutionary, the rebel, the seditionary, who was prepared to destroy all things.

As the mass working-class movement grew and improved its organisation, the ground was cut from under the lone-wolf revolutionaries, making increasingly meaningless the petty-bourgeois arguments about revolutionarism depending on the "devil inside." Against the background of the massive proletarian movement, the anarchists increasingly became revolutionaries of the catchword, malicious disorganisers of the revolutionary struggle, rallying to their black banners the degraded and declassed elements, intellectualist ma-

niacs of violence and destruction, men embittered against the world.

There are very many varieties of anarchism. It arose as the ideology of the urban vagabond and the lumpen proletarian, but it also has its peasant variants.

In Russian conditions, in particular, it exerted a great influence on the Narodist ideology and the various forms of peasant utopian socialism.

Anarchism is related to the various branches of Narodism by its assertions that the peasantry has "a socialist instinct," that the village commune is an embryo of socialism, and that peasant riots will rescue mankind from capitalism and exploitation.

In countries more backward than Russia, anarchism emerged even later, assuming forms stamped with their national peculiarities. In China, anarchism began to spread at the turn of the century, and gained headway after the 1917 revolution. But everywhere, sooner or later, it revealed what Lenin had said as long ago as 1901, namely, that throughout its history anarchism "has produced nothing but general platitudes against *exploitation*." ¹

Ideologically barren, anarchism nevertheless exerted its baneful influence on the revolutionary struggle of the working class and hampered it. In Russia in 1917 and during the civil war, the anarchists won a scandalous notoriety. During the national-revolutionary war in Spain, which broke out in 1936, the anarchists regarded as their main task not winning the war and defeating the fascists, but carrying out an instant "social revolu-

tion." In Aragon, where they managed to take over for a short time, they socialised almost all the property of the citizens and banned all political activity except their own. Under the pretext of collectivisation, they robbed the peasants of their land and livestock, forcing them to toil for very low, "equal for all" wages under the supervision of armed groups. This "collectivisation" led to subsistence farming, so that each village had to provide for itself. Excesses, violence and expropriation were the anarchists' official line. All this played into Franco's hands. Even today, there are outbreaks of anarchism, notably in Latin America and in Europe as well. Whenever the political situation grows acute, anarchist groups come to life and start to disorganise the mass movement.

Anarchism, "one of the most harmful elements of the working class,"¹ slid ever lower down the scale as Marxism won out in the working-class movement.

However, the spread of Marxist ideas across the world does not signify that the ideology of petty-bourgeois revolutionariness has disappeared for good. Lenin wrote: "The dialectics of history were such that the theoretical victory of Marxism compelled its enemies *to disguise themselves as Marxists.*"² He had in mind the "liberalism, rotten within" which strives to come to life as socialist opportunism, but this equally applies to petty-bourgeois revolutionariness, which tries to survive by changing its colour to look like Marxism, by using the cover of Marxist terminol-

¹ Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol 19, p 408.

² Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol 18, p. 584.

ogy and by seeking to win positions for itself within the working-class movement, which develops under the banner of Marxism-Leninism.

This gives rise to a new stage in the development of petty-bourgeois revolutionariness, which now appears in diverse "Left" and "ultra-Left" interpretations of Marxism, while retaining its traditional subjectivism, revolutionary catchwords and a blind faith in the miraculous power of "direct action," "the wrenching of this 'direct action' out of its general social and political context, without the slightest analysis of the latter..."¹

The anarchists used to accuse Marx and Engels of opportunism, while petty-bourgeois revolutionists of later generations direct the barbs of their accusations against Lenin and his followers. Today, ultra-revolutionary anarchist talk is couched in Marxist terminology, but its meaning is the same. The ultra-revolutionists said that Lenin's book, "*Left-Wing*" *Communism—an Infantile Disorder*, was an opportunist work.

In the subsequent period, the Leftist elements continued to make the slanderous accusation that the Comintern's Leninist line was a continuation of the wrong road "from revolution to reformism, from struggle to the tactics of diplomacy and illusionist smoothing over of contradictions and antagonisms."²

At that stage as well, Lenin said, petty-bourgeois revolutionariness "smacks of anarchism, or borrows something from the latter and, in all es-

¹ Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 15, p. 195.

² *The Activity of the Executive Committee and the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (from July 13, 1921, to February 1, 1922)*, Petrograd, 1922, p. 96.

sential matters, does not measure up to the conditions and requirements of a consistently proletarian class struggle.”¹ But today it claims to be the sole expression of the essence of Marxism, and loudly advertises itself as the only genuinely Marxist revolutionism. Having failed in their attempt to establish “Leftist” positions in contradistinction from Leninism, Leftist groups arising in the working-class movement in subsequent years and fighting against the Marxist parties, usually adopted names proclaiming connections with Leninism which did not actually exist. Their splitting organisations and political platforms have been called: “The Leninist Alliance,” “The Party of Marxist-Leninists,” “The Leninist Wing of the Party,” “Back to Leninism,” and “Long Live Leninism!”

In the earliest stage, it was Bakuninism that gave the most characteristic expression to a variegated anarchism, but it was Trotskyism that subsequently supplied the ideological goods for the numerous shades of petty-bourgeois revolutionariness. It is futile to seek to find in Trotskyism a coherent or, what is more important, ideological system. One need only turn to the history of this petty-bourgeois trend in Russia to see that the “swings” from one political line to another, which Lenin so resolutely exposed, were not episodes in Trotsky’s biography, but the hallmark of the Trotskyite outlook.

“In 1903”, Lenin wrote about Trotsky at the end of 1910, “he was a Menshevik; he abandoned Menshevism in 1904, returned to the Mensheviks in 1905 and merely flaunted ultra-revolutionary

¹ Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 31, p. 32.

phrases; in 1906 he left them again; at the end of 1906 he advocated electoral agreements with the Cadets (i.e., he was in fact once more with the Mensheviks)".¹ A few years later Lenin remarked that Trotsky had never had "any 'physiognomy' at all: the only thing he does have is a habit of changing sides, of skipping from the liberals to the Marxists and back again, of mouthing scraps of catchwords and bombastic parrot phrases."²

The only line which runs consistently through all of the swings of Trotskyism is its loud-mouthed revolutionarism, which ignores the objective conditions of the struggle and which is essentially borrowed from the anarchists.

In his "autobiographical essay", as Trotsky called his book, *My Life*, published in Berlin in 1930, he denies any connection with anarchism, but it will be easily seen that Trotsky's idea of revolutionism smacks of the anarchists' much-celebrated "devil inside."

In his book, Trotsky again and again returns to the "psychological type of revolutionary," insisting that "with enough experience, the eye will outwardly distinguish between the Bolshevik and the Menshevik, with only a small percentage of error." This is a highly amusing statement to hear from a man who had hobnobbed with the Mensheviks all his life and who had joined the Bolsheviks only in 1917. With unconcealed complacency Trotsky confesses to "social-revolutionary fatalism," flaunts his "revolutionary stand"

¹ Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 16, p. 391.

² Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 20, p. 160.

and is highly delighted at recalling that someone somewhere had said this: "Trotsky went about like a Leyden jar, and every contact with him caused a discharge."

This is how Trotsky describes what he calls the political leader's revolutionary inspiration: "The unconscious rises from its deep lair and subordinates the conscious working of the mind, suffusing it in a kind of higher unity." He says the activity of the leaders of the October Revolution was determined by the fact that "the latent forces of the organism, its deep instinct, and the feeling inherited from our animal ancestors—all of this rose up and broke down the doors of mental routine and—together with the highest historical-philosophical generalisations—stood the revolution in good stead."

This brings to mind Lenin's characteristic of Trotsky as "chatter-box," "catchword hero," a man endowed with "intolerable phrase-mongering," "naked exclamations, pompous words, and arrogant escapades." This phrase-mongering, far from being harmless, in fact serves to cover up petty-bourgeois revolutionariness, which in some historical conditions is capable of drawing close to proletarian revolutionism, but as a rule opposes and fights it.

In 1917, with revolutionary events in crescendo, Trotsky joined the Bolsheviks, but from then on, whenever the situation called for steadfastness, temporary retreats, or protracted struggle, not guaranteeing instant results, the disorganising essence of Trotskyism was quick to manifest itself, for it was prepared to sacrifice the actual gains of the victorious revolution for the sake of loud trumpetings about the coming revolution.

The Trotskyites fiercely attacked every step taken by the world movement to recruit new allies, and to work out a more flexible policy in line with the changing situation, and accused the Communists of revisionism, abandonment of revolutionary principles and a slipping down towards bourgeois positions.

When the Trotskyites were utterly routed in the Soviet Union, they intensified their splitting activity in the international arena. Trotsky expected to unite the ultra-Leftist sectarian elements which existed in some Communist Parties, to set up a common platform, to attract all the renegades and, by splitting some of the Parties to begin with, to split up the Communist International itself.

The Trotskyites did not succeed in their subversive activity, which they had carried on for many years within the Communist Parties so as to destroy the Comintern. Their pseudo-revolutionary platform in the international working-class movement was a complete flop, and they became an impotent sect. In 1938, having lost all hope of breaking up the Third, Communist International from inside, they set up their own, Fourth International, whose main task was to undermine the unity of the Marxist-Leninist Parties. It is now dragging out a miserable existence, and is torn by internal dissent.

The history of the struggle against Trotskyism, which sought to operate inside the Marxist movement, shows that Trotskyism's social base is insignificant, and that its cadres are being recruited mainly from intellectualist groups, declassed elements and all kinds of renegades and adventurists. These words of Lenin's about Trotsky fully

apply to the Trotskyists of our day: "Such types are characteristic of the flotsam of past historical formations."¹ But even they may be salvaged by favourable circumstances and may present some danger.

Now that socialism has become the leading force in the world, and more and more nations which had been oppressed for ages are entering the historical arena, there is ground to say that the manifestations of petty-bourgeois revolutionariness have entered a new stage.

Lenin used to say that backward or lagging economic relations ceaselessly breed supporters of the working-class movement who learn only some aspects of Marxism, only some parts of the new world outlook or some of its slogans and demands, but who are incapable of discarding all the petty-bourgeois and bourgeois views. Backward economic relations in Russia explain why the Marxists there had to fight so long and hard against the diverse manifestations of the petty-bourgeois ideology.

In China, at the time of the national-liberation revolution, the economic relations were even more backward. It was a vast country with stagnating semi-feudal relations, enslaved by the imperialist powers, who were rapaciously plundering her resources. It was a country of 1,200,000 villages, a sea of peasant households, mainly small tenant farms burdened by feudal services. For ages, the antediluvian hoe and sickle had been virtually the only implements of labour. In the towns there was a numerous petty bourgeoisie. Millions upon millions of men and women perished in the chro-

¹ Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 20, p. 347.

nic famines that hit the country with inexorable regularity. The agrarian question and liberation from imperialist dependence were the main problems of China's national life, which determined the nature of the mounting agrarian, national-liberation revolution.

In the early 1920s, when the Communist Party of China was taking shape, industrial proletariat in the country numbered less than three million. But in that period the Communist Party was growing with the upswing in the working-class movement, and workers predominated among its members. At the First All-China Congress of the Party in 1921, the delegates represented only about 50 members, at the Second Congress in 1922, 120; at the Third Congress in 1923, 400, and at the Fourth, in 1925, about 1,000. But by 1927, the Party already had over 57,900 members, of whom almost 58.3 per cent were workers.

Chiang Kai-shek's counter-revolutionary coup in the spring of 1927 led to the destruction of the working-class movement. Many experienced Communists, who had links with the working class, were killed, and the numerical strength of the Party was reduced to 10,000.

The cities were dominated by rampant reaction, and the situation was extremely unfavourable for any successful work. The Kuomintang had very strong positions and relied on numerous garrisons. Warships and marines of the imperialist powers were stationed in the main proletarian centres. After 1927, because of the conditions which had taken shape, the Communist Party was forced to concentrate its activity in the rural areas of the interior. For 22 years the Party was separated from the industrial centres. Its develop-

ment went hand in hand with the upswing of the agrarian revolution and the growth of the peasant movement. The Comintern repeatedly drew the Chinese Communists' attention to the fact that they were not using the possibilities of carrying on activity in the midst of the working class.

Peasants came to predominate among the members of the Communist Party. By the time the People's Republic of China was proclaimed in 1949, the Communist Party had roughly seven million members, of whom only four per cent were workers. Ten years earlier, Liu Shao-chi, remarking on the negative phenomena in the Party in connection with the specific features of its membership, said: "I think the reason is a simple one: our Party did not fall from the skies but emerged from the entrails of Chinese society." While there were those who had joined the Party to work for the great communist ideal, "for some of our comrades of peasant stock, communism meant the overthrow of the Tuhao¹ and the allotment of land." The new members included those who "found themselves in a desperate situation, who had no occupation, no work, no possibility to study, or because they wanted to escape the family yoke, to avoid a forced marriage, and so on. Finally, some people joined the Party in the hope of securing a reduction of taxes with its help, or of making their way in life. . . . It is quite natural that at this or that critical moment, in this or that situation some of them begin to vacillate and change for the worse."

¹ Tuhao—a category of rural exploiters, including kulaks, usurers and the keepers of gambling dens, connected with the criminal world and the police.—*Ed.*

The petty-bourgeois element, which not only surrounded the Party but which also had an effect on its membership, has been a constant source of the Party's many Right-opportunist and, mainly, Leftist mistakes.

In the history of the Communist Party of China there have been many instances of Leftist adventurism, which have done great harm to the working people's massive struggle. The harm and danger arising out of the activity of Trotskyite putschist elements in the Party were exposed at the Sixth Congress in 1928, and by the summer of 1930 a semi-Trotskyite group, headed by Li Li-san, gained the upper hand in the leadership of the CPC Central Committee. Its anti-Leninist line, the Comintern said, amounted to "putschist, adventurist tactics".¹

The revolution in China developed unevenly, there being no revolutionary situation throughout the country. However, the "Leftist" adventurists looked to the staging of uprisings regardless of the actual conditions, and in the areas liberated from the enemy to "direct and instant introduction of socialism". Li Li-san's main stake was on the still weak Red Army of China, which numbered 60,000 poorly armed fighters. Instead of consolidating the territorial base of the revolution, the "Leftist" adventurists sought to take big cities.

This most harmful policy gravely undermined

¹ Letter of the Executive Committee of the Communist International to the CPC Central Committee on the Li Li-san line (October 1930). See *Collection of Documents. The Strategy and Tactics of the Comintern in the National-Colonial Revolution, China's Example*, Moscow, 1934, pp. 283-290.

the Party's authority among the masses, and could have had disastrous consequences for the cause of the revolution, had not the Comintern helped the Chinese Communists to overcome their erroneous line.

It will be recalled that in the second half of the 1920s and in the early 1930s, many Communist Parties and the Comintern itself had made Leftist sectarian mistakes, which were condemned and corrected by the Seventh Congress of the Comintern in 1935. But with respect to China, the Comintern line was correct. It was worked out in acute struggle against the Trotskyites, who insisted that the revolution, which was coming to a head in China, would be socialist right away; they ignored the uneven development of the revolution in the various areas and clamoured for a general uprising.

The Comintern believed that at the first stage the revolution in China would be an anti-feudal one, which is why it recommended that alongside the work in the cities a territorial base for the revolution should be created in the countryside, warning against any premature general uprising, because the revolution was developing unevenly. It emphasised the importance of strengthening the young Red Army and mastering the tactics of guerrilla warfare.

The struggle against the Li Li-san line, this Leftist anti-Comintern deviation, was not an easy one. Even after Li Li-san was removed from the leadership, the attitude towards him remained a conciliatory one, and soon the fire was directed chiefly against those who had worked for consistently pursuing the Comintern line.

Subsequently, Mao Tse-tung did all he could

to falsify this period in the history of the CPC in his "Resolution on Some Questions in the History of Our Party." It was adopted by the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the CPC Central Committee in April 1945 as the official interpretation of the Party's history over the preceding decade under Mao Tse-tung's leadership.

This lengthy document says that Mao "never supported Li Li-san's line, but, on the contrary, rectified with much patience the 'Left' mistakes."¹ Actually, like Li Li-san himself, Mao believed at the time that "only after wiping out comparatively large enemy units and occupying the cities can we arouse the masses on a large scale."² He says this quite clearly in his letter, "A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire" (January 5, 1930). Six months later, in July 1930, in complete accord with Li Li-san's views, Mao wrote that both objective and subjective conditions for the victory of the revolution throughout the country had been created and a new upsurge of the revolution ensured. In that political situation, he added, the urgent task of the revolutionary masses was to concentrate all revolutionary forces, to take political power all over the country and to achieve the victory of the revolution on a national scale.

The "Resolution on Some Questions in the History of Our Party," which glorifies Mao Tse-tung as the saviour of the Party, who had never made any mistakes, confines itself to a purely verbal condemnation of "petty-bourgeois revolutionary hot-headedness," but says nothing of the fact that in 1929 it was Mao Tse-tung's plan for the occupation of the large city of Nanchang that

¹ Mao Tse-tung. *Sel. Works*, Vol. 4, p. 179.

² Mao Tse-tung. *Sel. Works*, Vol. 1, p. 123.

was one of the most dangerous manifestations of Leftist adventurism in the period. Another reckless venture was the taking of the city of Changsha in September 1930 by troops under Mao's command. The siege of the city cost many lives, but it was possible to hold it for only a few days. This gamble was likewise nothing but a practical implementation of the Li Li-san line.

Consequently, there is no reason to believe that Mao did not see eye to eye with Li. On the contrary, Mao may be regarded as Li's associate, who was quick to repudiate him when the Left-wing adventurism proved to be a fiasco.

This explains why the "Resolution on Some Questions in the History of Our Party" deals with the Li Li-san line in remarkably mild terms, and why all the thunder and lightning is directed at the supporters of the Comintern line. They were accused of criticising Mao for his "gun mania," "local loyalty and the conservatism inherent in the peasant mentality," and for underestimating the importance of the hegemony of the working class and work in the cities.

A simple comparison of the documents shows that the achievements which Mao Tse-tung credits to himself in establishing the importance of revolutionary bases in the countryside and the necessity for a united national anti-Japanese front, among others, were nothing but a concretisation of the corresponding Comintern propositions. The successes scored by the Chinese revolution under Mao Tse-tung's leadership were possible only because the Comintern insistently rectified the Leftist and the Right-opportunist mistakes made in China. That is perhaps why the "Resolution on Some Questions in the History of

Our Party" says nothing at all about the Comintern and the period when Mao took over the Party leadership, the Party's whole activity being considered completely outside the context of the international communist movement.

The Li Li-san line was not the only expression of "Leftism," semi-Trotskyism and Trotskyism in the Communist Party of China, and it is very close to the views held by Mao at the time. Li Li-san's penitent speech at the Eighth Congress of the CPC in 1956 is of unquestionable interest in this context.

Admitting his active part in the " 'Left'—opportunistic line," and responsibility for the mistakes, Li quite clearly showed the expressions of the "revolutionary fever," as he called it, which flared up inside him. He spoke about putschism, military adventurism and administrative-command methods, about ceaseless calls for uprisings, regardless of the situation, about his being "incapable coolly to hear out the views of others, and indiscriminately labelling opportunists comrades who did not share my views," and so on. But the most remarkable thing, perhaps, is his statement that in that period he had merely declared that putschism was wrong and had repudiated only some of his glaring mistakes. What then is the situation today? It turns out, as Li himself admits, that he cannot be quite sure that he has corrected his errors and that he would not repeat them in the future. He is convinced that "this monster, subjectivism, i.e., the idealist method of thinking, cannot be eliminated by incantations and oaths to destroy it. The subjectivist malaise may well produce a relapse as soon as suitable conditions appear."

While confessing to past mistakes, Li made no promises about the future, because petty-bourgeois defects, as he put it, are like weeds, which the "prairie fire does not destroy altogether, so that they grow up again when the spring winds begin to blow."

The years since the Eighth Congress have shown that Li displayed some insight in his prediction about a resurgence of the defects of petty-bourgeois revolutionariness when the appropriate conditions appeared.

While the Chinese revolution was in its anti-colonial, anti-feudal, bourgeois-democratic stage, the numerous petty-bourgeois elements who had joined the Party acted as revolutionaries capable of radically clearing the way for an advance from all the residue of feudalism and colonialism. At the time, Mao said: "Two steps have to be taken in the Chinese revolution: the first is New Democracy, and the second socialism. Moreover, the first step will take quite a long time and can by no means be accomplished overnight. We are not utopians and we cannot depart from the actual conditions confronting us."¹

In that period, the Communist Party of China won great victories, and under its leadership the Chinese people achieved a great deal, especially in agrarian reform and economic rehabilitation. But as the country was faced with ever more complex tasks arising from the construction of the economic foundation of socialism and the development of the new social relations, there were ever more pronounced signs of petty-bourgeois impatience and inability to switch from methods

¹ Mao Tse-tung. *Sel. Works*, Vol. 3, p. 128.

justified in wartime to absolutely new methods designed for a long period of socialist construction in peacetime and the need gradually to secure economic positions. This change of method is an objective necessity for successful construction, but it is no easy matter and calls for great steadfastness and consistency. With the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic in 1949, the democratic stage of the revolution was declared to be over. Democratic measures were declared to be socialist, and socialist-type transformations were carried out in haste, contrary to what Mao had but recently said about not departing from "the actual conditions confronting us." There came even more pronounced expressions of petty-bourgeois impatience, the urge to get ahead at all costs, regardless of the real possibilities, attempts to leap over inevitable stages of development which were determined by objective socio-economic factors and the level of the productive forces.

Lenin said that the idea of installing socialism overnight and securing a paradise in something like a cavalry charge was petty-bourgeois, adventurist and highly dangerous. In his article, *The Importance of Gold Now and After the Complete Victory of Socialism*, which he wrote in 1921, Lenin argued the need of a switch to the "gradual, cautious and round-about approach to the solution of the fundamental problems of economic development. . . The greatest, perhaps the only danger to the genuine revolutionary is that of exaggerated revolutionism, ignoring the limits and conditions in which revolutionary methods are appropriate and can be successfully employed." The revolutionary is sure to go down

if he starts virtually to idolize the "revolution", loses his sober approach and his ability to think deliberately, to weigh and to verify the circumstances in which revolutionary action should be taken and in which one should know how to switch to reformist action.¹

Mao Tse-tung, who was capable of taking revolutionary action when there was need to fight imperialism and domestic reaction, proved to be absolutely incapable of applying the methods without which it was impossible successfully to build a socialist society. Following the rehabilitation of the war-ruined economy, the Mao group began to impose on the Party a line which threatened to carry the country to economic disaster. This line naturally drew resistance from those who strove to build socialism relying on the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and on the experience of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

For a long time care was taken to conceal the differences within the Communist Party of China, but there was indirect evidence of an internal Party struggle. It was intensified after the Eighth Congress of the CPC (1956) and assumed various forms. The so-called cultural revolution has shown the extreme methods the Maoists are prepared to use to crush resistance to their adventurist line.

The Mao group's attitude gave fresh hope to the adventurers in the so-called Fourth International, who believed it has produced vast possibilities "opening up a field of activity Trotskyism has never had." In September 1960, on the eve of the Conference of 81 Communist and Workers'

¹ See Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 33, p. 109-111.

Parties in Moscow, the so-called Fourth International sent an open letter to the CPC Central Committee welcoming its stand as coinciding with the Trotskyite one, and suggesting that it should initiate an open discussion with the CPSU and the whole international communist movement. The letter said: "The Fourth International, which since its establishment. . . has been fighting the ideas you now oppose, is on your side."

In view of the Maoists' subsequent activity, the Trotskyite press trumpeted ever louder its assertions that "in its differences with Moscow, Peking is virtually taking a Trotskyite stand." The Trotskyite "International Secretariat" welcomed the "CPC's theses. . . because they have a clear similarity with some of the Marxist-revolutionary planks of our movement." In Britain, the Trotskyites were even more outspoken. Following the publication of a CPC 25-point letter setting out the Chinese leadership's line, they declared that what the Chinese called "25 points we call Trotskyism."

However, the fact that many of Mao's views are identical with those of the anarchists and the Trotskyites, and that they have been using the same methods in their subversive fight against the Marxist-Leninist Parties, does not at all mean that the concepts behind these manifestations of petty-bourgeois revolutionariness are identical.

It would be an oversimplification to think that Maoism sprang from anarchism or Trotskyism or that it is only a variety of either. The fact that Maoism has "discovered" for itself some propositions akin to those of the anarchists or the Trotskyites merely means that in face of the ob-

jective laws of social development petty-bourgeois pseudo-revolutionaries of every stripe usually resort to the same remedy—unbridled voluntarism. There is also the effect of the specific social base which produced anarchism and Trotskyism, and the one that is feeding the views of Mao's supporters. Anarchism is the outlook of the vagabond and the urban lumpen proletarian. Trotskyism is also a reflection mainly of the mood of declassed urban elements, including intellectuals, who have lost their bearings. The Mao group's petty-bourgeois revolutionariness is something else again: its origins are not urban but rural.

The specific conditions in China, that vast peasant country, in whose liberation from colonial dependence and feudalism the peasantry had such a great role to play, were bound to leave their mark on the manifestation of petty-bourgeois revolutionariness. That is why the views being spread by the Maoists reveal, alongside anarchist and Trotskyite ideas, purely Narodist views reminiscent of those held by the Russian SRs, both Right and Left, against whom the Bolsheviks carried on a resolute struggle.

Some say that it is not right to compare Trotskyism, which was at first manifestly anti-peasant, and Narodist-SR views, which are claimed to be an expression of peasant interests. However, the evolution of the Trotskyites and the SRs has brought their positions closer together. Trotskyism and Narodist-SR petty-bourgeois socialism have in common many fundamental methods and features characteristic of petty-bourgeois revolutionariness, such as emphasis of the destructive nature of revolution, inability to de-

termine the role and place of classes in it, the view of revolution as an act of pure will, unwarranted haste, and various others.

It is natural that many of those who wish to gain a reputation for being revolutionaries style themselves Marxist-Leninists in this epoch of world-wide historical transition from capitalism to socialism, a transition illumined by Marxist-Leninist ideas.

But "not everyone that saith Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven," as the saying goes. It is not enough to style oneself a Marxist to be one, and that is something the Maoists have definitely not become. Mao started out by declaring that he would "apply the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism to China's concrete conditions." A few years later, he set forth the task of making Marxism Chinese, and seeing to it that it had a "Chinese character in its every manifestation." After that Mao's supporters claimed that he had transformed Marxism from a European into an Asian form, that he had "Sinicised" Marxism.

However, Marxist doctrine cannot be Sinicised, Nipponised or Russified. Reformists, revisionists and anti-Communists of every stripe have used up reams of paper in their efforts to prove that Leninism was a purely Russian phenomenon, irrelevant to other European countries. These efforts have been nullified not only by Marxist criticism, but by life itself. These falsifiers are now receiving support from China.

The events in China have borne out Lenin's warning of the danger in backward countries where ideologies arise which "seize upon *one* aspect of the labour movement, elevate one-sided-

ness to a theory.”¹ The Mao group has seized upon one aspect of Marxism, the one which consists in recognising the role of the subjective factor in history, and have discarded the other, which calls for the sober and fully scientific approach in analysing the objective state of things. This one-sidedness, which means a break with Marxism, is set up as a theory, quite apart from the fact that in contrast to many earlier manifestations of petty-bourgeois revolutionariness, it is given a patently nationalistic twist.

Of course, there are objective conditions for manifestations of petty-bourgeois revolutionariness in China, just as they had existed in Russia, and as they exist in other backward peasant countries. However, because the conditions for the spread of a malaise are there, it does not mean that it has to develop into an epidemic. It is, in fact, the task of a Marxist political leadership not only to discern various dangers but also to combat them, and to overcome the erroneous views which may destroy the revolution.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union coped with the task because it had relentlessly fought both Right opportunism and every variety of Leftist pseudo-revolutionism. In 1920, Lenin wrote: “When it came into being in 1903, Bolshevism took over the tradition of a ruthless struggle against petty-bourgeois, semi-anarchist (or dilettante-anarchist) revolutionism.”²

The Bolsheviks had to carry on an especially hard struggle in the subsequent period, when the Party defended the Leninist line of socialist construction. Great importance attached to the ideo-

¹ Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 16, p. 351

² Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 31, p. 33.

logical and political defeat of Trotskyism, which was spreading scepticism about the strength of the working class of the USSR insisting that socialism could not win out in the USSR unless the proletarian revolution first triumphed in the West.

The absence of any solid tradition of combating Leftist ultra-revolutionism had its effect in China, with its difficulties of socialist construction in a backward country. Proponents of the adventurist, great-power line, camouflaged with Leftist catchwords, began to predominate in the leadership.

The Communists are sure that in the present epoch any country, however backward, can develop successfully along the non-capitalist way and arrive at socialism. If the Mongolian People's Republic was able victoriously to advance along this way at a time when there was only one socialist country in the world—the Soviet Union—ringed by hostile capitalist states, today, with the world socialist system steadily gaining in strength, there is even more certainty that socialism can triumph in any developing country.

What is happening in China is not at all inevitable in a backward country. It is the exception that proves the rule.

The Maoists, trampling the principles of proletarian internationalism, have decided to forgo co-operation with the socialist countries, whose assistance so considerably promoted the achievements of the People's Republic of China. The results of this policy confirm that a backward country like China can advance successfully along the socialist path only by relying on the socialist community, on its assistance and experience.

POVERTY OF PHILOSOPHY

The integrity and theoretical power of an ideological trend is best judged by its philosophical foundation. Marxism-Leninism has for its theoretical foundation dialectical materialism, which has helped to turn socialism from a vision into a science, and which has enabled the working class to act consciously, in accordance with historical necessity and the objective laws of social development. Petty-bourgeois revolutionariness has essentially no coherent philosophical foundation. The whole spectrum of petty-bourgeois revolutionary trends is based on an eclectic mixture of the most contradictory theoretical propositions, never rising above pragmatism, which holds that truth is that which is useful and advantageous in practice.

One hundred and twenty years ago, Marx published his book criticising the economic views of Proudhon, a founder of anarchism. It examined the principles of petty-bourgeois political economy, but was called *The Poverty of Philosophy*. Marx was replying to Proudhon's book, the *Philosophy of Poverty*, but his title was more than a play on words. Marx's examination of Proudhon's economic constructions went hand in hand with his analysis of the initial assumptions behind anarchist method and theory, which were totally untenable and revealed a poverty of philosophy.

Proudhon's economic constructions and his reactionary idea of equalising the classes and preserving small-scale property have long since been consigned to the scrap-heap of history. However, the specific mentality of the petty-bourgeois ideologists, the vulgar initial assumptions, and the variously combined metaphysical views—all of which Marx brilliantly brought out—have subsequently been manifest in every fresh version of petty-bourgeois opportunism or revolutionariness.

Another feature that has been repeated again and again was Proudhon's manner of exposition, which one would think was purely personal. Marx wrote: "The style is... ampoulé. High-sounding speculative jargon... A self-advertising, self-glorifying, boastful tone and especially the twaddle about '*science*' and sham display of it."¹

History has shown these features to be more than Proudhon's individual qualities. They are a common feature of all petty-bourgeois ideologists, which is something of a protective covering for their feeble empty concepts, a sort of inferiority complex displayed by the poverty of philosophy.

At first sight, petty-bourgeois revolutionariness appears to come in the most contradictory modifications. The fact alone that Proudhon favoured the preservation of private property, while Bakunin recognised collective property only, seemed to make their brands of anarchism different. Proudhon favoured peaceable, harmless forms of struggle, and Bakunin, violent ones. Anarchism rejects political struggle, and Trotskyism, by contrast, recognises nothing but political struggle, ignoring

¹ Marx and Engels. *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1965, p. 155.

all the rest. This comparison could well be continued, but for all their differences of form, all petty-bourgeois revolutionary trends have this in common: they are boundlessly subjective and are moved by the urge to recast the world in a speculative mould with the aid of a handful of men who have come to see the necessity of change.

The philosophy of anarchism is extremely primitive, and Marx said it was a "mess... brewed from bits of Proudhon, St. Simon, and others."¹ Lenin also remarked that anarchism had "no doctrine, revolutionary teaching, or theory."² Whatever the brand of anarchism, its principles are metaphysics, veiled in dialectical terms, and undisguised subjectivism.

We find roughly the same thing in Trotskyism. It has always seen the specific situation in the wrong light because it always starts by substituting a subjective scheme for objective reality, and never allows for any other way of resolving the contradictions except by aggravating them to the extreme of cataclysmic clashes.

Trotsky saw Soviet society as an equilibrium of classes which was bound to develop into a disequilibrium. He believed the contradictions between the proletariat and the peasantry could be resolved only through inevitable antagonistic conflicts and, because the peasantry was much more numerous, he predicted an inevitable "Thermidor," the restoration of capitalism.

His panic exaggeration of the objective "inevabilities," which he himself had invented, eclectically resided side by side in his theory with the

¹ Marx and Engels. *Selected Correspondence*, p. 270.

² Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 5, p. 328.

purely adventurist view of the possibilities of the subjective factor, which for him was not the masses, or even the Party, but the "leading personnel," as he put it. According to his recipe, the trade-union problem could be solved simply by a shake-up of the leadership. At a later period, when criticising the Comintern and accusing it of delaying the world revolution, Trotsky once again reduced everything to the "leading personnel" problem. The Trotskyites of the "Fourth International" have the same answer to this question: why has the hour of the world revolution not yet struck? They say: it is all because of a "crisis of the revolutionary leadership."

For Trotsky, the "leading personnel" possesses a supernatural power, being able at will to leap over various stages, and "tighten up the screws." This is subjectivism, pure and simple, and if Trotsky has made a personal contribution to it, it has been merely to convert it into a bureaucratic subjectivism.

Camouflaging his views as Leninism in fighting the Comintern, Trotsky sought to represent Bolshevism as something rigidly straightforward. In 1928 he wrote: "Solid rock and not flexibility has been and must be today the main feature of Bolshevism." This was completely at variance with Lenin's demand for the Communist Party "to resort to changes of tack, to conciliation and compromises. . . *knowing how* to apply these tactics in order to *raise*—not lower—the *general* level of proletarian class-consciousness, revolutionary spirit, and ability to fight and win."¹

One-sidedness, exaggeration, theoretical false-

¹ Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 31, p. 74.

hood and other similar features, which characterise Trotsky's methods and which Lenin observed, likewise constitute the "philosophical store" of Maoism.

Maoism, which developed on Chinese soil, was necessarily affected by the ideological, moral, and ethical doctrines which have their origin in hoary antiquity and which have been drummed into the minds of the people as the official state ideology over a period of 2,000 years. The doctrine of Confucius, the great philosopher of ancient China, is now an ingredient of the Chinese national character and their mentality.

One Confucian precept is implicit obedience of one's seniors, and unquestioning acceptance of the words of the "sage." Many students of Chinese history note the inclination to scholasticism and blind, absolute faith in the teachings of philosophers, which is an element of Chinese thinking. The whole school system is designed to impress upon young minds values as formulated in rules and aphorisms by the ancient sages, developing not an aptitude to independent thinking, but an urge to reveal the received idea in the most felicitous light.

Academician V. M. Alekseyev, an outstanding Russian student of China, travelled in the interior of that country as a young scientist in 1907. In his diaries, which are full of sympathy for the Chinese people, he describes among their other qualities the following: "the Chinese addiction to the quotation and the allusion, which is expressed on every convenient occasion;" education "through the committing to memory of facts and names and in later years the reading of scholastic historical discourses;" the cult of the "perfect per-

sonality," which develops into "idolatry"; special collections "containing the most interesting maxims for every occasion in life," and much else that has in no sense disappeared since then but has in fact played a significant role in the period of major social change.

All these specific features of China's social, economic and cultural development have had an effect on petty-bourgeois revolutionariness, which is not a new phenomenon at all, and of which Maoism is the most repulsive form.

In contrast to other exponents of petty-bourgeois revolutionariness, who did not style themselves philosophers and have not left any philosophical works, Mao Tse-tung clearly lays claim to a niche in the philosophical pantheon. In his life-story, which he told to American journalist Edgar Snow, he emphasised that he had been an eager student of philosophy in his young years, and had read Confucius and other ancient Chinese philosophers, although he assured Snow that he had not liked the classics. Mao said that he had read Spinoza, Kant, Goethe, Hegel and Rousseau, but there is no sign of this in his own writings, which abound in all sorts of references, especially to the ancient Chinese philosophers.

At one time, he had been carried away by anarchism, and he told Snow as much. In that period, he said, he had frequently discussed problems of anarchism and its possibilities in China, and had shared many of its aims.

Mao read his first Marxist book (*Manifesto of the Communist Party*) at the age of 27, since when he has regarded himself as a Marxist. However, Marxist ideas fell on ground overgrown with ideas which had nothing in common

with Marxism. The sprouting of a hybrid was a real danger, and it made itself felt.

Years later, Mao Tse-tung was to publish his own philosophical works. Today, all of these, without exception, beginning with two lectures, "On Practice" and "Concerning Contradiction", which appeared in 1937, have been officially declared "a brilliant contribution to the treasure-house of world Marxist-Leninist philosophy" and "an enrichment and development of dialectical materialism."

Actually, Mao's works are an eclectic mixture, an oversimplified exposition of widely known principles of dialectical materialism, the author's own "contribution" being a substitution of idealism for Marxist materialism, and of metaphysics for dialectics.

Mao's views were greatly influenced by Lao-tsu, the naive, spontaneous materialist of ancient China, who said: "One can learn about others by looking at oneself; one can learn about other families by looking at one family; one can learn about other villages by looking at one village; one can learn about other kingdoms by looking at one kingdom; one can learn about the whole world by looking at one country. How do I know that the world is such? Because of this."

On the strength of this idea Lao-tsu was convinced that superfluous knowledge was only a hindrance. He insisted that "it is hard to rule a people when it has much knowledge."

It was no accident that a discussion "on the identity of thinking and being" was organised in 1960, when the effects of the economic policy in China had made themselves fully felt. At this discussion, a severe drubbing was administered to

philosophers who held that this invented identity was idealism in disguise which had the unambiguous *ad hoc* purpose of justifying the failures and mistakes in domestic and foreign policy.

Because everything Mao says is at once declared in China to be "another brilliant contribution," the identity of thinking and being was at once proclaimed to be a "new" theory. Actually, it is a very old idealistic theory which, Engels said, was one of the wildest products of a fevered imagination, and which, Lenin said, was definitely reactionary.

Whereas the urge to deduce the reality of one's ideas from an identity of thinking and being is idealism veiled, the effort to invest "Mao Tse-tung's thought" with a supernatural and universal power is idealism laid bare. Idea comes to dominate matter. Material production is assigned an insignificant role, and it is not the development of production but the level of man's consciousness that is the source of progress. Marxism-Leninism believes the people to be the true makers of history, that man has the decisive role to play in social production, and that progressive ideas are a powerful force in social development. But the truly revolutionary doctrine does not separate man from material production, but regards them as a unity. The prime mover of history is not abstract, ideal man but real, living man, with all his vices and virtues, acting in concrete historical conditions, with their level of productive forces and means of labour. The attempt to ignore this unity of man and his material environment has been and continues to be a source of grave mistakes. One need merely contrast one of the ele-

ments of this unity and the other to turn truth into its opposite.

Right-wing opportunism has always erected an antithesis between the level of the productive forces and man, leaving virtually no room for man's active transforming effort. Everything depends on the material conditions of life. That is vulgar economic materialism, a philosophy of passiveness and *laissez faire*, and a justification of inaction and time-serving.

The Left-wing opportunists make the same mistake, "only from the other side." In setting up an antithesis between man and the productive forces, they in fact deny that man's successful transforming activity requires any objective prerequisite. Everything depends on man alone, on his purposefulness and consciousness. This is vulgar subjectivism, a philosophy of boundless voluntarism and a justification of adventurism and projecteering.

It is not hard to explain why this philosophy has spread in China. The low level of development of the productive forces, the prevalence of the most primitive implements of labour, a vast and steadily growing population produced the objective prerequisites for the oversimplified idea that anything can be achieved merely by everyone putting his back into the effort.

The antithesis between man and the material possibilities is extended not only to every sphere of the economy but also to war. Lin Piao, who, according to the Chinese press, "carries the Red Banner of Mao Tse-tung's thought higher than anyone else," insists that "it is not this or that death-dealing weapon, like a plane, a gun, a tank or an atomic bomb, but Mao Tse-tung's thought

that is the best weapon." (However, the glorification of the power of Mao's thought has not prevented the Maoists from investing vast resources into making their own nuclear weapons, thereby putting a terrible strain on the economy.)

By contrasting man and his real environment, the Maoists present an oversimplified schematised man deprived of any sensory perception of life, deprived of his own thoughts and emotions, and completely adapted to a mechanical implementation of Mao's instructions. That is the very opposite of what Lenin said when he emphasised the need to build socialism "not with abstract human material, or with human material specially prepared by us, but with the human material bequeathed to us by capitalism. True, that is no easy matter, but no other approach to this task is serious enough to warrant discussion."¹

The fact that objectively there is soil in China for voluntarist ideals and all manner of fantastic constructions does not make these correct and does not in any sense justify the mistaken practices based on them. Sooner or later, substitution of idealism for materialism carries things to an impasse and results in bankruptcy, because only that which is a correct reflection of life's real requirements and laws can be established.

While presenting his subjective idealism as Marxist materialism, Mao also gives his own interpretation of Marxist dialectics. The law of development that springs from the internal contradictions in phenomena—the unity and struggle of opposites—is reduced by Mao to a primitive scheme which is of no practical value in analysing

¹ Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 31, p. 50.

reality. The diversity of life with its various contradictions—necessary and casual, essential and secondary, antagonistic and non-antagonistic—gives way to a simple enumeration of contradictions. That is almost exactly what the philosophers of ancient China used to do at the dawn of the scientific cognition of the world.

Here is Mao's static views of contradictions: "Without life, there would be no death; without death, there would also be no life. Without 'above' there would be no 'below'; without 'below', there would also be no 'above.' Without misfortune, there would be no good fortune; without good fortune, there would also be no misfortune. Without facility, there would be no difficulty; without difficulty there would also be no facility. Without landlords, there would be no tenant-peasants; without tenant-peasants, there would be no landlords. Without the bourgeoisie, there would be no proletariat; without a proletariat, there would also be no bourgeoisie. Without imperialist oppression of the nations, there would be no colonies and semi-colonies; without colonies and semi-colonies, there would also be no imperialist oppression of the nations. All opposite elements are like this. . ."¹

How does Mao see the development and struggle of these opposites? He sees them as a simple transformation of one into the other, as they change places: "Each of the two contradictory aspects within a thing, because of certain conditions, tends to transform itself into the other, to transfer itself to the opposite position."² Mao in-

¹ Mao Tse-tung. *Sel. Works*, Vol. 2, pp. 43-44.

² *ibid.*, p. 44.

sists that the substance of the socialist revolution is that the proletariat is transformed from a subjugated class into a ruling class, while the bourgeoisie takes the place of its opposite; landowners and peasants change places, war and peace alternate, and so on.

This scheme has nothing in common with Marxist dialectics. The interaction and interpenetration of opposites disappear, and struggle is seen only as a clash of antagonistic forces. But this is convenient in providing a "theoretical" justification for subversive activity within the international communist movement (unity is bound to be followed by split), for vindication of any planned miscalculations (the achieved equilibrium is bound to give way to disequilibrium), for denial of the possibilities of the struggle for peace, which must inevitably give way to war, and for proclaiming that even in socialist society the class struggle must remain what it was before the socialist revolution.

This kind of "dialectics" is a very convenient pretext for not bothering to make a concrete analysis of the concrete situation, but to set out the contradictions as one sees fit, reducing the whole point in the science and art of political leadership to sharpening contradictions, and lending unbridled subjectivism the semblance of ideology.

The spontaneous materialism and naive dialectics of the philosophers of ancient China reflected the level of contemporary scientific cognition. Those who are spreading Maoist ideas realise that there is a striking resemblance between these ideas and those of the ancient philosophers. Since it is impossible to deny this, why not try to pre-

sent ancient Chinese philosophy as being of universal and lasting significance.

From year to year there has been a growing tendency to present ancient Chinese philosophy as the ultimate source of wisdom. Works have been written to prove that it is one of the sources of atheism, materialism, naturalism and the rationalism of the French Encyclopaedists, and one of the sources of the Great French Revolution. The authors of these writings have discovered the influence of Chinese philosophy in the works of Kant, Fichte and Hegel.

Let us note, however, that this "recoining" of the past was started in China some time ago. Kuo Mo-jo has long been trying to present Confucius as Marx's immediate predecessor. In a story published in 1920 and reprinted in 1950, he gives an imaginary conversation between Marx and Confucius in which Marx expresses pleasure at meeting his fellow-thinker who lived in the East over 2,000 years earlier.

The attempts to present as Marxism views which have nothing in common with it have assumed diverse forms. In particular, the philosophical discussion held in 1964, before the so-called cultural revolution, provides evidence of efforts to substitute metaphysics for dialectics. Chinese press reports said that this philosophical discussion, "in the number of those who took part, in its influence and significance, has not been matched by anything in our scientific circles for many years." The central question of the discussion was "the dichotomy of the unity" and "fusion of the two into unity." There were 90 articles on this problem in the period from June to August. The aim of the discussion was "to expose those who had

come out for the concrete historical approach to the unity of the objective and the subjective, believing that dialectics consists not only in a division of the unity but also in a joining of the opposites in a new quality on a new basis.

There was harsh condemnation of philosophers guided by the ideas expressed by Lenin in his polemics against the Trotskyites, who had metaphysically contrasted moral and material incentives and who had held them to be incompatible with each other. The Maoists did not relish what Lenin said at the end of 1920: "But after all we do have some knowledge of Marxism and have learned how and when opposites can and must be combined; and what is most important is that in the three and a half years of our revolution we have actually combined opposites again and again."¹

The Maoists were right in viewing as criticism of their policy the dialectical demand not only to differentiate between opposites, but also to see their connection with each other, and in the urge to learn to use this connection in building socialism. But, subjectivists as they are, they decided not to correct their policy but to "correct" the objective laws of dialectics. Mao insisted: "The contradictory aspects in every process exclude each other, struggle with each other and are opposed to each other. Such contradictory aspects are contained without exception in the process of all things in the world and in human thought."²

There are no exceptions. This means that

¹ Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 32, p. 27.

² Mao Tse-tung. *Sel. Works*, Vol. 2, p. 4.

whenever differences arise in the Party, the only way to resolve the contradictions is the moral, or even the physical, destruction of all those who have an opinion of their own. If the importance of subjective effort is recognised, what need is there to say anything about the influence of objective conditions.

The significance of the line directed only at "dividing the unity" is most clearly seen from the Maoist views of man: all men are divided into good and bad, true followers of Mao, and dog's heads; the good have no vices, the bad have no virtues.

The Maoists view all phenomena in their static form and in isolation from each other, outside their contradictory inter-penetration, thereby creating the following scheme: the ideal hero (the revolutionary) has nothing but good qualities, such as courage, steadfastness and so on, while the negative character (the reactionary, the revisionist) has cowardice, vacillation, a yearning for pleasure and all the rest.

The propaganda machine has declared a fierce war on writers and artists depicting the "average man", who has merits alongside shortcomings. This possibility is ruled out by the "division of the unity," leaving no room at all for any human qualities beyond the framework of the established scheme. Dialectics is fully supplanted by metaphysics.

In his *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Marx ridiculed Proudhon for having borrowed from Hegel's dialectics "nothing ... but the language. For him the dialectic movement is the dogmatic distinction between good and bad..."

According to Marx, Proudhon "...has the

drawback of being stricken with sterility when it is a question of engendering a new category by dialectical birth-throes. What constitutes dialectical movement is the co-existence of two contradictory sides, their conflict and their fusion into a new category. The very setting of the problem of eliminating the bad side cuts short the dialectical movement. It is not the category which is posed and opposed to itself, by its contradictory nature, it is M. Proudhon who gets excited, perplexed and frets and fumes between the two sides of the category.”¹

Petty-bourgeois philosophy has not made much headway, and remains virtually as poor as ever, capable only of producing various absurd theoretical constructions and adventurist practices.

¹ Marx and Engels. *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Moscow, 1955, pp. 125-126.

"PERMANENT REVOLUTION"

Marxists believe that social revolution is made necessary and inevitable by the conditions and requirements of material life in society, and the objective laws of the class struggle. For the petty-bourgeois revolutionist, revolution is the response of the insurgent spirit to injustice, a fight for a moral ideal, an abstract idea about a better future.

Marxists believe that the correct tactics can be based only on "an objective consideration of the sum total of the relations between absolutely all the classes in a given society, and consequently a consideration of the objective stage of development reached by that society and of the relations between it and other societies."¹ In the process, they regard all classes not as static, but as being in motion. Hence, the Marxist demand for a clear definition of the motive forces and nature of each revolution, its immediate and ultimate aims, and the relations between the various stages the revolution is to pass through.

For the petty-bourgeois revolutionist, the only touchstone of acceptable tactics is to "be more revolutionary than the rest." Hence, the total indifference to assessment of the objective possibilities of the given stage, and the urge to put for-

¹ Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 21, p. 75.

ward maximalist slogans on the "all or nothing" basis.

The anarchists accused Marx and Engels of opportunism. They said: "Don't you understand that the revolutionary must always have and believe to have the right to rouse the people to revolt". Those who do not believe in the people's "readiness" for revolution do not, they insist, have faith in the revolution at all. "That is why we cannot wait, that is why we do not allow any delay or procrastination. We can no longer be bothered with the question of 'What is to be done?' That has been settled long ago. It is to make revolution. How? As best one can." Replying to these loud-mouthed revolutionists, Engels showed that these calls appear to come from men who are not down here, on this wicked earth of ours, but are somewhere up there, in the empyrean of abstract talk, behind which "there is absolutely nothing except revolutionary inaction."¹

The wild "revolutionary" calls of the anarchists met with response in Italy, Spain and other countries so long as the working-class movement was still embryonic. The anarchists strove to present any expression of discontent as signifying the end of the capitalist system. In 1873, with revolutionary events in the offing in Spain, an anarchist newspaper wrote: "In Barcelona nothing has happened as yet, but there is permanent revolution on so important a spot as the public square!" This drew from Engels the sarcastic remark that that was an anarchist revolution, "which consists in ceaselessly sounding the trumpets, and for this

¹ Marx and Engels. *Works*, Vol. 18, p. 535, 2nd Russ. Ed.

very reason is 'permanently' unable to move from the 'spot'.¹

Anarchists do not see any difference between "bourgeois," "bourgeois-democratic" and "socialist" revolution, and take a very simple view of the concrete problems which each of them has to tackle, and of the complex relations at the successive stages of the revolutionary struggle. For them the idea of "revolution" boils down to a spontaneous riot amounting to a "social abolition" in which everything that can be destroyed—the state, the old culture—is destroyed, with the new society arising in a void.

Hence their assertion that the revolutionary "knows only one science, the science of destruction"; hence, too, their stake on the instinct of revolt and resentment, which is allegedly part of every man's make-up. Having come up against the growing organisation of the working-class movement, which had shed the naive rebellious ideas of its early period, the anarchists declared the working class to be incapable of struggle. Bakunin classified all peoples under two heads: those capable and incapable of carrying out a revolution. He asserted that the peoples who are free from material privation tend to lose their revolutionary spirit; only the poor peoples, the peasant peoples above all, can be revolutionary. The peasantry was declared to be the spontaneous vehicle of socialist ideas.

The utopian view of the peasantry's special mission, and the fantastic ideas about revolutionary tactics were overcome as the development of capitalism eroded the soil from which peasant

¹ Marx and Engels. *Works*, Vol. 18, p. 463, 2nd Russ. Ed.

utopias sprang, and as Marxist ideas gained ever wider currency and recognition, as the only true expression of the need for social development.

However, old ideas never disappear altogether, and are capable of reviving in new conditions, imitating the views predominant in the revolutionary movement. One case of this imitation was connected with the use by petty-bourgeois revolutionaries of Marx and Engels's term "permanent revolution" to produce a conception which has nothing in common with Marxism.

In the first *Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League*, issued in March 1850, Marx and Engels emphasised that the working class cannot be content with the victories that suit the bourgeoisie or even the democratic petty-bourgeoisie, which strives to end the revolution as soon as possible. They added: "It is our interest and our task to make the revolution permanent, until all more or less possessing classes have been forced out of their position of dominance, until the proletariat has conquered state power."¹ The Address ends with a call upon the workers to take an independent stand and to prevent themselves from being diverted from the path of organising their own party, whose slogan "must be permanent revolution."

The Marxist idea of continuous revolution stems logically from the fact that the proletariat is the only consistently revolutionary class refusing to be reconciled with any form of oppression; its historical mission is to build a classless society.

At the time, Marxists believed that socialist revolution could win only as a world-wide revo-

¹ Marx and Engels. *Sel. Works*, Vol. 1, p. 110.

lution, involving the main capitalist countries, at least. By "permanent revolution" Marx and Engels meant the proletariat's victory not only in one country but in all the leading countries of the world.

Half a century later, the Marxist views of the continuous revolution were elaborated in Lenin's theory of the growing of bourgeois-democratic revolution into socialist revolution. By then, the world capitalist system had already ripened for transition to socialism, so that the revolution, starting out as a bourgeois revolution, had the objective possibility of going beyond the destruction of feudal survivals, all the way to the establishment of a proletarian dictatorship. Lenin believed that everything would depend on who led the revolution: the bourgeoisie whose interests lay in stopping it as soon as possible, or the proletariat, which, rallying all the working people, could carry the revolution to a victory for socialism. In 1905, Lenin wrote: "...from the democratic revolution we shall at once, and precisely in accordance with the measure of our strength, the strength of the class-conscious and organised proletariat, begin to pass to the socialist revolution. We stand for uninterrupted revolution."¹

In 1905, Lenin had not yet formulated his conclusion about the possibility of socialism winning in one country. However, Lenin's theory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution growing into socialist revolution rested on the internal potential of the revolution. His book, *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*, and all his other writings during the tempestuous

¹ Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 9, p. 237.

years of the first Russian revolution are permeated with confidence that the prospects of the movement and the speed at which the stages of the revolution succeed each other depend above all on the strength of the working class, its organisation and ability to carry the peasantry with it.

This explains why Lenin urged that the framework of the bourgeois-democratic revolution should be "extended to vast proportions," and shows that he was clearly aware that it was impossible to leap over that stage of the revolution so as to tackle socialist tasks right away. Lenin believed that to ignore the democratic stage and its concomitant tasks, that any minimisation of these tasks was "a travesty of theoretical Marxism."¹ He urged the Party to set out general democratic tasks before the whole people to the fullest possible scope, and regarded the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry as the new type of power which could carry the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the end and see that it grew over into a socialist revolution.

The travesty of theoretical Marxism, of which Lenin spoke, was also in evidence at other periods. It made itself felt in various forms in subsequent years and not only in Russia, but also in the international communist movement.

Trotsky had a hand in this travesty of Marxism when, in contrast to the propositions of Marx and Engels about the permanent revolution and Lenin's theory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution growing into a socialist revolution, he came up with his "permanent revolution" theory, which

¹ Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 9, p. 112.

Lenin said was an "absurdly Left" theory.¹

Trotsky's slogan in 1905 was "No tsar, but a workers' government". It was an expression of the urge to leap over the bourgeois-democratic revolution which was under way in Russia. Lenin said: "Trotsky's major mistake is that he ignores the bourgeois character of the revolution and has no clear conception of the transition from this revolution to the socialist revolution."²

After the bourgeois-democratic revolution in February 1917, Lenin put forward the "All Power to the Soviets!" slogan, which he saw as the way of moving to the socialist revolution. "But," Lenin asked in his *Letters on Tactics*, "are we not in danger of falling into subjectivism, of wanting to arrive at the socialist revolution by 'skipping' the bourgeois-democratic revolution—which is not yet completed and has not yet exhausted the peasant movement?"

"I might be incurring this danger if I said: 'No Tsar, but a *workers'* government."³

In Russia's conditions, Trotsky's "permanent revolution" meant ignoring the peasantry's revolutionary possibilities and regarding it as an anti-revolutionary force. The Trotskyites showed signs of their anti-peasant policy even after the socialist revolution had won out. But if we take Trotskyism not only in its Russian variant, but as a claim to provide some kind of general scheme for a world-wide socialist revolution, we find that the main thing in Trotskyism is its urge, at any cost, to leap over a stage of revolutionary development that is still there. In some instances

¹ Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 20, p. 346.

² Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 15, p. 371.

³ Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 24, p. 48.

this leapfrogging signifies a break with the peasantry, in others it may lead to abandonment of other allies: the national bourgeoisie, the urban petty-bourgeois sections, and so on.

Characteristically, present-day Trotskyites, while continuing to idolise the "permanent revolution" doctrine, which the "Fourth International" considers "its most precious legacy," have virtually abandoned Trotsky's view of the peasantry as a reactionary force. In the hope of somehow modernising their attitudes in view of the advancing national-liberation movement, the Trotskyites have come to speak of the peasant countries of the East as an "emergent new vanguard," ascribing to them a "radical and crucial role," but continuing to spread their "permanent revolution doctrine," which allegedly opens up in Asia, Africa and Latin America the prospect of a leap towards socialism. Some Leftist-minded Communists representing the peoples in the East urged the Second All-Russia Congress of Communist Organisations of the Peoples of the East in 1919 to "set up an Eastern Red Army from among the already revolutionised peoples of the East—Tatars, Bashkirs, Kirghiz and the peoples of Turkestan—to carry the revolution to the East."¹ This idea was supported by Trotsky, but sharply condemned by Lenin, who believed that it was a dangerous gamble to try to start revolution in Asia through a military campaign. In contrast to the proponents of permanent revolution, Lenin believed that what was needed was not "acceleration of revolution, but faster preparation of revolution."²

¹ See *The Comintern and the East*, Moscow, 1969, p. 93.

² Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 41, p. 455, 5th Russ. Ed.

Trotsky used to argue that it was possible to leap over stages of social development that had not yet been passed. He declared: "It is absurd to say that it is altogether impossible to leap over some stages." Marxist-Leninists do not deny the possibility of leaps in the revolutionary process, but they regard them as an objective phenomenon which has been prepared by earlier development, and not merely as resulting from a revolutionary onrush.

What gives Maoism and Trotskyism a deep-going methodological unity is their common subjective urge to leap over some stages and to contrast revolution in one country to world revolution. Like the Trotskyites, the Maoists have been urging the establishment of socialism in any country, regardless of the prerequisites, and always through the use of armed force.

The Maoists insist that the peoples of the developing countries, taking the path of independent national development, must overthrow their governments by means of armed force and instantly proclaim socialist construction.

One need only look at Peking's attitude to the Communists' parliamentary activity and their selfless struggle in defence of democracy. The dialectics of history is such that as the liberation movement grows and the influence of the working class increases, the monopoly bourgeoisie begins to find the bourgeois democratic order irksome. It starts a drive against democratic freedoms, seeking to revise the constitution and repeal the more or less progressive laws. In such conditions, defence of democracy—limited, and largely nominal bourgeois democracy—and the movement for its extension and renewal becomes

a struggle against the monopolies and helps to undermine the pillars of the capitalist system.

In the article, "Once again about Comrade Togliatti's Differences with Us," the editorial boards of *Jenmin jihpao* and *Hunchi* "explained" that in bourgeois parliaments seats are not won in struggle but are handed out at the discretion of the bourgeoisie for the purpose of corrupting the working class and its leaders. They wrote: "In the light of its own interests, the bourgeoisie, in definite conditions, may allow the representatives of a working-class political party to enter its parliament. That is precisely its way of trying to confuse some representatives and leaders of the working class and to corrupt and even to bribe them." It turns out that the Communists' victories at the elections, according to Peking, are hand-outs by the bourgeoisie, and constitute parliamentary cretinism.

The reformists and Right-wing opportunists spread the illusion that the fundamental interests of the working people can be met without revolution, solely by securing various reforms and concessions. They contrast the revolution with the struggle for vital demands. The Left-wing opportunists also contrast the revolution to such demands but in a different way. They insist that the struggle for democracy and the working people's urgent needs merely serves to divert them from revolution, and that those who believe that radical democratic change can help increasingly broader masses to gain an awareness of the need for socialism are not revolutionaries at all.

However, historical experience in general, and the class battles of the recent period in particular show that both the reformist and Leftist illusions

are quite empty. The 1969 International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties, referring to this experience, declared that it serves to confirm with fresh force the basic propositions of Marxism. The Main Document of the Conference said: "In contrast to the Right and 'Left' opportunists, the Communist and Workers' Parties do not counterpose the fight for deep-going economic and social demands, and for advanced democracy to the struggle for socialism, but regard it as a part of the struggle for socialism."¹

Life has provided more and more confirmation of Lenin's warning that "changes of a truly democratic nature, and especially political revolutions, can under no circumstances whatsoever either obscure or weaken the slogan of a socialist revolution. On the contrary, they always bring it closer, extend its basis, and draw new sections of the petty-bourgeoisie and the semi-proletarian masses into the socialist struggle."²

Marxism-Leninism sees revolution above all as a take-over of state power by the revolutionary class, without in any way connecting the idea of revolution with this or that form of take-over. Lenin said: "The passing of state power from one *class* to another is the first, the principal, the basic sign of a *revolution*, both in the strictly scientific and in the practical political meaning of that term."³ There can be no revolutionary transformation of the existing system without a revolutionary overthrow of the ruling class, but the overthrow

¹ *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties*, Moscow, 1969, p. 24.

² Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 21, p. 339.

³ Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 24, p. 44.

of the exploiters can assume different forms. That is why Marxists have never agreed with those who shift the emphasis from the content of the concept of revolution to the forms in which it is carried out. A different view is taken in Peking. The pamphlet entitled *Long Live Leninism!* says that "Revolution implies the use of revolutionary force by the oppressed class, implies revolutionary war."

When in 1938, in the conditions of the long civil war and the armed resistance to the Japanese invaders, Mao Tse-tung said that war was the main form of struggle in China and that "power stems from the gun," this accorded with the concrete situation in the country. However, even at that time Mao was not inclined to confine himself to characterising specifics of the struggle in China, but preferred to present these specifics as being universal. His article extolling the gun as the source of power starts with this flat assertion: "The central task of the revolution and its highest form is the seizure of power by means of arms, that is, solution of the question by means of war. This revolutionary principle of Marxism-Leninism is true everywhere; it is unquestionably true both for China and for other states."¹

The activity of Maoist groups in European countries shows that their view of the revolutionary approach in present-day conditions means terroristic acts, arson, obstructions, fights, knifings and other similarly less than original methods once hopelessly advocated by the anarchists. These methods were unworkable in the old days, and they are even more absurd now that there is

¹ Mao Tse-tung. *Sel. Works*, Vol. 11, p. 379.

an organised and massive working-class movement.

We find, therefore, that the only revolutionary action Maoists recognise is revolutionary war and armed uprising; they regard as opportunism and treason any other kind of struggle against the ruling classes.

This stereotyping of methods and forms of struggle has nothing in common with the truly revolutionary approach. An analysis of the specific features of the present epoch has shown that in some conditions there is a real possibility of uniting a majority of the people, carrying the socialist revolution to victory and winning state power without civil war.

Lenin never assessed the forms of struggle from an abstract standpoint of utmost revolutionariness but from the standpoint of how well these forms met the objective conditions of struggle by actual social forces and to what extent they helped to enlarge the mass movement and raise it to a higher level. Lenin emphasised that the Bolsheviks could never and would never try to be "more revolutionary than anyone else" and that the distorted and senseless tactics of anarchism, of "making" revolution, was organically alien to them.

In itself the revolutionary slogan which seems to urge the most resolute forms of struggle inevitably becomes an empty thing, whenever it is proclaimed without regard for the specific features of the stage and the actual forms of movement. Lenin said that it was harmful "when people refuse to reckon with the actual situation that has arisen and the actual conditions of the particular mass movement, because of a slogan misinter-

puted as unchangeable. Such an application of a slogan inevitably degenerates into revolutionary phrase-mongering.”¹

There are no universal forms of struggle which apply to any situation. What appears to be the only possible mode of action in one set of conditions and has truly played a revolutionary role may become anti-revolutionary in a different situation. On the contrary, what may have been evidence of repudiation of revolutionary struggle may, in different historical conditions, become the most important form of struggle to carry forward the revolution.

The urge to make any form of struggle universal is in itself dogmatic and essentially anti-revolutionary. Forms of struggle are not invented or borrowed from outside. They are produced in the very movement of the masses and depend on the concrete features of each historical moment. Lenin said: “Under no circumstances does Marxism confine itself to the forms of struggle possible and in existence at the given moment only, recognising as it does that new forms of struggle, unknown to the participants of the given period, *inevitably* arise as the given social situation changes.”² That is why Lenin kept stressing that the revolutionary class “to accomplish its task. . . must be able to master *all* forms or aspects of social activity without exception” and “must be prepared for the most rapid and brusque replacement of one form by another.”³

This idea was expressed in the Main Document of the International Conference of Com-

¹ Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 15, p. 215.

² Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 11, p. 213.

³ Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 31, p. 96.

munist and Workers' Parties, which said that each Party guided by the principles of Marxism-Leninism takes account of concrete national conditions, works out its policy completely on its own, and selects, depending on the circumstances, the peaceful or the non-peaceful way of transition to socialism, and means of struggle either involving or not involving the use of arms. In doing so, the Communists stress that whatever the form the struggle assumes, the main condition of success is powerful mass action by the working class and broad masses of people. Lenin said that the revolutionary energy of the mass is the only real force compelling change.

This leapfrogging is only one aspect of Trotsky's "permanent revolution." There is another one bearing on the relation between revolutionary struggle at home and the advance of the international revolution.

Realising that to ignore the bourgeois democratic tasks in a backward country would create a difficult situation for the proletariat and isolate it from the broad mass of peasants, Trotsky argued that the only way out was to carry the flames of the revolution into the international arena. In a 1922 preface to his book, *1905*, he explained the substance of his "permanent revolution" in these words: "The contradictions in the position of a workers' government in a backward country, with an overwhelmingly peasant population, may be resolved only on an international scale, in the arena of the proletariat's world revolution."

Lenin's theory of revolution, without in any way minimising the importance of the external conditions in which the revolution develops,

without ignoring the importance of the international factor, started above all from the internal motive forces and set out the reasons why the revolution could be completed by relying on these forces. The "permanent revolution" theory, however, switches the centre of gravity from the development of the revolution's internal possibilities to the extent to which it is capable of inflaming revolutionary development in other countries, thereby making the revolution in one country entirely dependent on international support. The outwardly revolutionary slogan, "No tsar, but a workers' government" was a reflection not of faith in the revolution's internal possibilities, but, on the contrary, of total disbelief in them and of reckless expectation of nothing but support from outside.

Being forced to reckon with the triumphant spread of Lenin's ideas within the working-class movement, Trotsky adopted the hypocritical tactic of masquerading as a supporter of Leninism, denying the very existence of Trotskyism as a trend outside Leninism. Up until 1928, Trotsky asserted that the "differences between the two lines, the 'permanent' and the Leninist, were of secondary and minor importance." He tried hard to prove that "the permanent revolution doctrine" was nothing but Lenin's theory of the democratic revolution growing into the socialist revolution, with the sole difference that the revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, a slogan in which Lenin expressed the whole content of the growing-over process, was, in Trotsky's view, unrealistic, whereas the "permanent revolution" slogan led directly and immediately to the proletarian dictatorship.

Trotsky sought to show that there was a minor distinction between Lenin's theory of socialist revolution and his own "permanent revolution" in order to cover up the gap separating Leninism and Trotskyism, which was the gist of the matter.

That this was more than a purely theoretical, abstract problem, or a minor distinction, that it was in fact a burning political problem, was evident not only in Russia, but in every country where the Leftist elements sought to make the outcome of the revolution dependent on the victory of revolution throughout the world.

Anti-Marxist views on the relation between revolution in one country and the world revolution were current in China as early as the 1930s. Li Li-san, arguing that "an immediate revolutionary situation was maturing throughout the world as a whole," declared in 1930: "The victory of the Chinese revolution cannot be ensured or won without a victory of the world revolution." Once again, the mark of petty-bourgeois revolutionariness revealed itself as the ultra-revolutionary phrase meekly existing side by side with the capitulationist disbelief in the internal forces of the revolution. Diverse variants of the "permanent revolution" theory spread in China in subsequent years as well.

The relation between revolution in one country and world revolution is a problem which is directly connected with the prospect of social development after the revolution triumphs.

Just after the Great October Revolution, Trotsky's "permanent revolution" theory was to have served as a justification for allowing the young Soviet Republic to be sacrificed, considering that it was incapable of crushing world imperial-

ism. After the civil war and the defeat of the intervention, when the country faced the question of socialist construction, the "permanent revolution" theory served as an ideological basis for denying the possibility of building socialism in one country.

When the country was faced with this objective alternative: either to advance along the way of socialist construction, without expecting immediate assistance from a world revolution, in every way defending the breathing space, or to pursue a policy of starting a revolutionary war, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union exposed with fresh force the reckless nature of Trotsky's "permanent revolution" theory.

The CPSU's successful activity in rallying the people in the struggle for socialism, and in scoring a brilliant victory, eliminated the question of whether or not it was possible to build socialism in one country. The Trotskyite soothsayers were bitterly ridiculed by life itself. Socialism triumphed in the Soviet Union in the most difficult conditions, in a capitalist encirclement. For many years the advocates of the "permanent revolution" doctrine tried hard to deny that the Soviet system was a socialist one, and prophesied its imminent degeneration. Their efforts were shattered by reality.

When the new Programme of the CPSU, which laid down the main lines of communist construction in the USSR, met with approval by the whole international communist movement, the Chinese leaders also said it was a "majestic plan of communist construction by the Soviet people." They said this in a message of greetings from the CPC Central Committee addressed to the

22nd Congress of the CPSU and signed by Mao Tse-tung. But Mao soon began to avoid saying that the construction going forward in the Soviet Union was communist, and then declared that the CPSU Programme was aimed "against the peoples' revolution" and "for the preservation and restoration of capitalism."

Once again there emerged the thesis that so long as capitalism existed in the world, a country which had carried out a socialist revolution could resolve its internal contradictions not on a national but only on an international scale. It is true that at one time this pseudo-revolutionary and essentially capitulationist assertion was aimed against the construction of socialism; today it is aimed against the construction of communism. At one time, the Trotskyites denied that socialism could win in one country. Today Mao's supporters deny that communism can win in several countries, arguing that it can do so only on a world scale.

Attacking communist construction in the USSR, Maoist propagandists hope to take heart from loud talk designed to fan the world revolution by any possible means. It turns out that the danger of communist construction lies in the people's allegedly resting on their laurels and ceasing to bother about the world revolution, all of which "depresses the people's political awareness and militancy." It turns out that the shortest way to communism does not lie in working out and implementing a programme of communist construction, but in throwing it out and "fighting imperialism with all the available forces."

Those who favour the abstract formula of "the revolutionary must make revolution" find it very

hard to understand that dedicated work under socialism is a real expression of the revolutionary spirit. Of course, the image of the Red Army man with cartridge belts slung over his shoulders, is much more easily identified as the image of a revolutionary than that of the scientist in his laboratory or the manager in his plant, but today the revolutionary spirit in the socialist countries is not expressed in fighting on the barricades, but in improving the socialist system, in building up its economic and military potential and multiplying its spiritual values.

The loud-mouthed revolutionaries want the communist movement to accept their reckless ideas, which essentially spring from scepticism over the strength of socialism, in place of the Leninist conviction that socialism exerts its main influence on international developments by its economic successes and that the powerful example of the new society under construction serves to revolutionise the development of all mankind.

The Maoists do not believe that socialism can win in their own country. On July 14, 1964, *Jenmin jihpao* carried the ninth article of its series of "replies" to the Open Letter of the CPSU Central Committee. This article said that it was in fact impossible to secure the final construction of socialism until imperialism and capitalism had been destroyed all over the world. Accordingly, they estimate that it will take not years or decades, but centuries, even thousands of years to build socialism and advance to communism. This article says that "The stage of uninterrupted socialist revolution," "the stage of proletarian dictatorship" will last "hundreds and thousands of years, and even ten thousand years." Throughout

this period, which turns out to be longer than the whole of the preceding history of class society, acute class struggle will continue on the principle of "who beats whom."

It would be wrong to assume that Mao had always held such views. Not long ago, in 1958, he proclaimed the slogan of "Three years of stubborn labour—ten thousand years of happiness."

The Eighth Congress of the CPC in 1956 managed to retain a more or less realistic stand despite the growing Leftist tendencies on concrete questions of economic construction. Its resolution set the task "to establish within three five-year periods or a somewhat longer time a basically integrated industrial system so that industrial production should be the main element of social production"; it emphasised that it was necessary "appropriately to couple construction in the country with improvement of the people's living standards," and warned that if the real situation were ignored "and too high a pace established, this could, in fact, hamper the development of the economy and fulfilment of the plan, and would be an adventurist mistake."¹ At the Congress there was criticism of the tendency "blindly to run ahead of things."

Subsequent events showed, however, that Mao's supporters, having apparently failed to get their line adopted by the Congress, started to implement it in the teeth of its decisions.

The so-called Great Leap Forward was announced in 1958. Hardly had the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee adopted its decision in

¹ *Proceedings of the Eighth All-China Congress of the Communist Party of China*, pp. 472, 477-478.

August 1958 on increasing the grain crop that year by 60 per cent, when *Hunchi* reported on November 16 that Mao wanted the crop to be doubled not only in 1958 but also in 1959. The slogan put forward in early 1958—"Catch up With and Surpass Britain in the Output of Key Industrial Products Within 15 or Slightly More Years"—was then reduced to seven years, and later even to two-three years for some branches. Some of the targets set for 1962 implied that China would forge ahead of the USA in many lines. The attempt to leap over some of the outstanding tasks of the transition period was a complete fiasco. It took several years merely to make good some of the losses inflicted by the Great Leap Forward policy. Even today, some observers believe—no statistical data are now published in China—her economy remains on the 1957 level.

However, as soon as the economic situation was somewhat stabilised, Mao resumed his efforts to push the country into fresh "leaps." During the so-called cultural revolution it was announced that Mao had nothing to do with the decisions of the Eighth Congress of the CPC, which his group now regards as incorrect.

China's transition from her 22-year armed struggle to peaceful construction could not but produce Right-opportunist and Leftist vacillations. In 1949, China's economy was even more backward than Russia's in 1921. It is true that the difficulties China faced were of a different type from those the first socialist country had had to overcome in the hostile ring of capitalist encirclement.

However, the leading group of China's Communist Party capitulated in face of these difficult-

ies. It refused to reckon with the objectively inevitable fact that military methods cannot be applied to peaceful economic construction. Mao ignored the fact that the switch to other methods and tempos is not accidental but inevitable, that it does not take place through the fault of individuals or parties, but for objective reasons. He ignored the fact that in a backward country socialism can be built only in alliance with the world socialist system and the world working-class movement. Once they broke up this alliance, the Maoists in fact jettisoned socialist ideals and sought a way out through various gambles.

It is an objective law that after the revolution wins out economic construction and the boosting of production necessarily come to the fore. Socialism can be established only on the basis of a highly developed industry and advanced technology which has to be carried to every branch of the social economy. A backward country, where political power is in the hands of the working classes, can by-pass the capitalist stage of development, but it cannot avoid the stage of building the material and technical basis of socialism. No matter how the pace of the economic development after the victory of the revolution is accelerated, success in socialist construction cannot be achieved by leaps and bounds. Politics, for all the transforming power it has, can be successful only when it is not contrasted with economics, but accords with it, or, as Lenin said, when it becomes a concentrated expression of economics.

The Mao group set up politics as an antithesis to economics, arguing that politics, the commanding force, was higher than any economic laws. An editorial article in *Hunchi* No. 11 for 1967 ex-

plained that "All this talk about the so-called organisation of social life and the development of the productive forces amounts to a set of fraudulent tricks of old revisionism".

Those who believed that the development of the productive forces should be central to the Party's activity, and that in the economic sphere advance should be gradual and balanced were branded as revisionists.

In China, a horde of hungweipings were trained blindly to accept these "exhaustive instructions" of Lin Piao: "There are two ways in the building of our state. The first is the way of the Soviet Union, where one-sided attention is being given only to the production of material values, to the making of machines, to mechanisation, and to what is known as material incentives.

"The other way is the way we are advancing under the leadership of Chairman Mao. Under Chairman Mao's leadership we have created a new type of state. This state, apart from mechanisation, believes revolutionisation to be the most important. We shall direct mechanisation with the aid of revolutionisation." ¹

The Chinese press keeps publishing articles insisting that "We must be prepared to undertake responsibility for liberating the majority of the peoples of the whole world." ²

The collapse of the hopes to achieve a full victory for socialism in a couple of leaps led to the announcement that the socialist revolution was continuous. Since 1958 the Chinese press has been saying things like: "One leap after another, one

¹ *Chingchun pao*, March 5, 1967.

² *Tsefang tsunpao*, May 23, 1965.

revolution after another, one continuous leap, one continuous revolution," and "Complete one revolution, start another." This went on until the revolution was declared to be a permanent state of society. The Maoists present the "permanent revolution" as the only way of solving all social problems, as a means which "constantly stimulates enthusiasm among the cadres and the masses," while their propaganda machine began to glorify Mao as the man who produced the doctrine of revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The Maoist brand of "permanent revolution" as applied to the country's domestic tasks, proclaims that problems in the creation of a new society which appear to have been solved long ago will keep arising again and again with an ever sharper edge.

It turns out that the task of fighting for power has once again arisen in a country where, according to all the official CPC documents, the dictatorship of the proletariat had been established. That is why instead of such qualities of the Lenin-type revolutionary as strong bonds with the masses, organisational skill, steadfastness and flexibility, there is acclamation of fanaticism and personal loyalty to the leader. This produced the need to resurrect anarchist terminology, which reduced the idea of the "revolutionary" to that of the "rebel" and the "seditionary." Numerous units of juveniles—hungweipings—and older people—tsaofangs—were organised, and these were not only called rioters, but in fact widely used violent and riotous methods which the anarchists had extolled.

It is impossible from the standpoint of the

Marxist-Leninist theory of classes and the class struggle to explain the need of fighting for power after a revolutionary take-over. Classes are known to differ from each other according to their relation to the means of production. Lenin wrote: "The abolition of classes means placing *all* citizens on an *equal* footing with regard to the *means of production* belonging to society as a whole. It means giving all citizens *equal* opportunities of working on the publicly-owned means of production, on the publicly-owned land, at the publicly-owned factories, and so forth".¹ That is exactly what was happening in China as in the other countries taking the socialist path.

Equal status with respect to the means of production is the basis of social unity and determines the way in which the contradictions arising in it are solved. But that is something Mao's supporters refuse to accept. Ten years after the problem of "who beats whom" was decided in China, people are being told in all seriousness that in order to eliminate the exploiting classes there is need not only "to eliminate classes in the sphere of the economy" but also "to destroy the classes in the sphere of politics, ideology, outlook, way of life, and so on." This makes it possible to accuse anyone of belonging to the bourgeoisie, to brand him as a class enemy, regardless of his social status, merely for motives of politics, ideology, outlook and way of life. All a man needs to be declared a "capitalist" is to express disagreement with or even doubt about any of Mao's thoughts.

At one time in Russia, the SRs were indignant over the fact that Lenin had exposed them as ex-

¹ Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 20, p. 146.

pressing the interests of the petty bourgeoisie. They had the most absurd idea about classes, and Lenin ridiculed them when he said that "they . . . write about the petty bourgeoisie as if this term does not signify a social category, but is simply a polemical turn of speech."¹ Present-day Chinese representatives of petty-bourgeois revolutionariness have also ceased to regard the "bourgeoisie" as a social category. It is nothing but a word of abuse, a label that can be tagged on to anyone who disagrees with them. Let us note, however, that the thunder and lightning being hurled at the heads of those who are branded as the bourgeoisie is not aimed against the real bourgeoisie, which still exists in China, and which still collects a share of the profits from its old enterprises.²

In all countries, the Communists see their coming victory as being connected with the rise of a massive revolutionary movement of their peoples. They oppose any import of revolution, any administering of pushes to it from outside, and condemn those who think that revolution can be accelerated artificially, at will. In 1918, Lenin said: "Of course, there are people who believe that revolution can break out in a foreign country to order, by agreement. These people are either mad or they are provocateurs. We have experienced two revolutions during the past twelve years. We know that revolutions cannot be made to order, or by agreement; they break out when

¹ Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 6, p. 199.

² There are more than a million capitalists in China. At one time, the payment to them of a share of the profits by their former enterprises was to have ceased in 1962, but then the deadline was moved to 1966, and it has now been moved forward by another 10 years.

tens of millions of people come to the conclusion that it is impossible to live the old way any longer.”¹

The ideas about the need to give the revolution a push, which were spread by Trotsky and all sorts of “loud-mouthed revolutionaries,” were resolutely condemned by Lenin as adventurist, as deeply alien to Marxism, and as capable in practice of resulting in a situation where the working people, who are to be “blessed with socialism” through a revolutionary war and the import of revolution, may find themselves captives of their own bourgeoisie.

Lin Piao told the so-called Ninth Congress of the CPC in April 1969 that “final victory in one socialist country not only calls for efforts by the proletariat and broad masses of people in the given country, but also depends on the triumph of the world revolution and the elimination of man’s exploitation of man all over the world.” In China, the Trotskyite denial of the possibility of socialism winning in individual countries has now been proclaimed as the official line, with all the consequences that this entails.

¹ Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 27, p. 480.

STAKE ON WAR

Petty-bourgeois pseudo-revolutionism has always been characterised by hopes of war being the way allegedly leading to a solution of all revolutionary tasks. Lack of faith in the internal forces of the revolution led to the tactics of plotting and rioting, and also of expectations that pushes from outside could give history a move.

During the period of the Communist League, Marx and Engels had to fight sectarians who held that all the questions of the revolution could be solved by means of armed force. Some adventurers fancied that the conflict between Austria and Prussia in 1850 would result in a war that would become a prologue to a new revolution in Germany. These sectarians, who had less than 200 supporters, insisted a year later that there was need to set up a "European revolutionary army" that would use armed force to put an end to "rotten capitalism on the brink of a collapse."

However, the 19th century was a period of relatively peaceful capitalist development, and did not produce much ground for the spread of such military-revolutionary illusions. By contrast, the epoch of imperialism, the First World War especially, promoted the spread of adventurist hopes among petty-bourgeois revolutionists that a war could help to carry out a world revolution.

When the Great October Socialist Revolution triumphed, petty-bourgeois revolutionists tried to

get the world's first socialist state to adopt a policy of fighting a revolutionary war, and declared that the policy of peaceful co-existence of states with different social systems amounted to capitulation to imperialism, while the struggle for peace was a futile hope which, in addition, ruled out the possibility of a world-wide victory for socialism.

A chapter in Trotsky's book, *Permanent Revolution*, is entitled: "From Marxism to Pacifism." It presents Marxism as a doctrine allegedly denying any possibility of fighting for peace. That is why the Soviet Union's peaceful policy, all its efforts designed to frustrate imperialist attempts to start a war are declared to be a departure from Marxism and a switch to pacifist positions.

When in face of the mounting danger of fascist aggression, the Soviet Union sought to conclude a collective security pact with Britain, France and other capitalist countries, the Trotskyites at once declared this to be an attempt to prevent the proletariat from carrying out a socialist revolution.

Trotsky held that the main point was how war could be prevented or halted. In reply to this question he flatly declared: "The struggle against war is decided only in revolutionary struggle for power". In other words, it is impossible to secure peace before the world revolution triumphs.

Because the Trotskyites pinned their hopes for a possible revolution on war, it was natural for them to yearn for armed conflicts, and since then Trotskyism has not changed substantially in any way.

In between the two world wars, the forces of peace were not yet strong enough on an international scale to frustrate the policy of the im-

perialists, who were hoping to do away with the socialist state by means of armed force. Although the war was not averted, the Soviet Union's peaceful efforts and the active struggle against the danger of war by the Communist International and all the peaceloving forces played a great part in putting off the clash and creating more favourable conditions for victory over the warmongers.

This victory and the subsequent formation of the world socialist system, the disintegration of colonialism and the emergence of numerous national states with a stake in peace, and the greater influence exerted by the democratic forces brought about a marked change in the international situation.

Although the world balance of forces has changed radically, the Trotskyite maniacs in the "Fourth International" continue to repeat their teacher's incantations that it is impossible to struggle for peace except by fighting for power, and where this is impossible, there is nothing for it but to let the thunder of war roar on.

In their propaganda, the Maoists have been repeating, with very slight modifications, what Trotsky used to say about war and peace 30 or 40 years ago, and what present-day Trotskyites are saying on this score.

The Maoists have declared that the struggle for peace and the line towards the peaceful co-existence of states with different social systems is an abandonment of the world revolution and all but a betrayal of the working people's interests. All those who stand for this line are branded as revisionists betraying the interests of world revolution for the sake of their own wel-

fare. The Maoists insist that "peaceful co-existence is substitution of pacifism for the world proletarian revolution and a departure from proletarian internationalism" (the sixth article of *Jenmin jihpao* and *Hunchi* on the Open Letter of the CPSU Central Committee). This happens to be exactly what Trotsky used to say in the old days.

To be fair let us note that these ideas occur in Mao's early works. He believed that armed force was the only way war could be prevented and eliminated. In 1936, he wrote: "There is only one way to abolish war, and it is to wage war against war." Two years later he insisted that "War can be abolished only through war."

Of course, armed struggle was the only way to victory and peace in China during the civil war and the anti-Japanese national-liberation war. But the whole point is that what Mao said in this or that concrete situation is instantly converted into an absolute truth which holds good for all peoples and all times.

Just recently, Mao came up with this new idea: "As for the question of world war, there are only two possibilities: either the war will cause a revolution, or a revolution will prevent the war." Since the Maoists hold that the way to revolution lies through war, the "idea" about these two possibilities is a hypocritical one. The fact is that the two add up to one and the same "possibility" of solving all problems through war.

Paying lip-service to the effectiveness of nothing but military means of class struggle, the Maoists have for the time being shunned any other form of struggle, spurning these as opportunism and revisionism. However, no one in the

world has seriously considered the abuse of the imperialists and the endless "serious warnings" as being at all effective. It is the same old drum beat that has accompanied petty-bourgeois revolutionariness since it emerged, and that is designed to cover up its revolutionary inactivity.

Meanwhile, peaceful co-existence, which all petty-bourgeois revolutionists have been fiercely attacking, is in fact a most acute form of class struggle on the international scale, which calls for self-control, firmness and flexibility, resolution and mobility, and the ability either to use the language of ultimatum or to accept compromises. It goes without saying that peaceful co-existence implies a high state of vigilance on the part of the communist movement with respect to the designs of the imperialists, and constant concern on the part of the socialist states about their military potential and greater defence capability.

What is the essence of the policy of peaceful co-existence between states with different social systems which is being pursued by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries? It is above all that its aim is to ensure favourable international conditions for socialist and communist construction, support the national-liberation movement, give resolute rebuffs to the aggressive forces of imperialism and strive to safeguard mankind from another world war.

The people in Peking "explain" that the struggle for peace and the struggle for socialism are not one and the same thing. But it does not follow from this that there is no connection between the struggle for peace and the struggle for socialism. The policy of peaceful co-existence of

states with different social systems is designed to ensure the conditions in which socialism can prove—and is proving—its superiority over capitalism. Lenin foresaw the inevitable competition between the two modes of production, the two formations, the two economies—the communist and the capitalist—on an international scale, a competition in the course of which socialism would exert a revolutionary influence by the power of its example.

The struggle for peace slogan, far from clashing with the tasks of the struggle for communism, in fact promotes their fulfilment. The struggle for peace, helping in the solution of the proletariat's class tasks, is a general democratic struggle capable of uniting not only the working class, the peasantry, the urban petty-bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia, but even the section of the bourgeoisie which is aware of the dangers of thermonuclear war. Extension of the front of the fighters for peace objectively goes to reinforce the positions of those who are paving the way for the victory of socialism. This is one of the manifestations of the connection between the struggle for democracy and the struggle for socialism, a connection which the Communist Parties believe to be very important and which Mao's supporters reject out of hand.

While trying to impose on the world communist movement the invented, non-existent dilemma—either the struggle for peace or the struggle for socialist revolution—and labelling as revisionists everyone who believes that peace helps to strengthen the positions of socialism throughout the world, the Chinese extremists say that however great the losses in a war they will

be swiftly made good by the victory of the world revolution.

That is an old and hackneyed argument. In 1936, Trotsky asserted that if the coming "war remains only a war, the Soviet Union's defeat is inevitable." But is such a prospect to be feared? After all, even a "military defeat for the Soviet Union would be only a short episode in the event the proletariat won in the other countries."

These ignominious prophecies have been ridiculed by history. Only the Soviet Union's victory saved mankind from fascism, helped socialism to be established in more countries, and set off the disintegration of the colonial system of imperialism. One can easily imagine the state of this planet of ours if history had developed according to Trotsky.

Today, we find Mao Tse-tung readily offering to "sacrifice" the population of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries (naturally, except China). He has somewhat modernised his adventurist ideas as applied to the atomic age. Addressing the Moscow Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in 1957, Mao said: "How can one estimate the number of human casualties that a future war may cause? Perhaps they will add up to one-third of the 2,700 million population of the world, i.e., only 900 million people. I think this is even too small a figure, if atomic bombs are actually dropped." Mao then went on to declare that he was prepared to sacrifice 300 million Chinese for the sake of a "victory of the world socialist revolution" and that there was no need to fear these losses. He added: "If one-half of mankind is destroyed, there remains the other half, but imperialism will be completely destroyed and only

socialism will remain throughout the world, and within half a century or a full century the population will be even bigger than it was originally".

That speech created a painful impression on the audience. At one time, Chinese bourgeois ideologists argued that China had no need to fear other countries, because "there are vast numbers of us Chinese." In 1903, for instance, the bourgeois ideologist Chen Tien-hua wrote: "It is not much of a disaster if a few million or even tens of millions of people perish. When we save the country, the population shortage will be made good within a few decades."

We find this old bourgeois, basically cannibalist "idea," being adopted by a man who styles himself a Marxist. In 1957, one could imagine that this monstrous talk about readiness to sacrifice one half of mankind was something in the nature of a Chinese metaphor or a parable of no practical significance. However, some two and a half years later, a pamphlet entitled *Long Live Leninism!* cynically asserted that the sacrifice of something like one-half of mankind is easily made good. It says: "On the ruins of destroyed imperialism the victorious people will create at an extremely fast pace a civilisation which is a thousand times higher than that under the capitalist system, building their own, truly beautiful future."

Nevertheless, many believed that these Maoist attacks on the propositions adopted by the international communist movement concerning the possibility of averting war, their proposition on the connection between the struggle for peace and the struggle for socialism, and the proposition that the peaceful co-existence of states with different social systems helps to create the most

favourable conditions for the advance of the national-liberation movement. that all these attacks fell within the sphere of purely ideological differences, which had no direct bearing on practical politics.

It is true that so long as the men in Peking, proclaiming their various ultra-revolutionary propositions, did not, for state reasons, risk dotting all the i's, the present-day Trotskyites, who had an absolutely free hand and were true to their ideology of impatience, hastened to offer the kindred spirits in China some "sound" advice. In its so-called Open Letter of December 16, 1962, the "Fourth International" invited Mao to "discuss the question of the inevitability of world war and the question of a preventive war, as these are posed by the CPC and the Fourth International." The Trotskyites were dissatisfied over the fact that Mao's followers failed to make a full statement of their views, noting that in contrast to the latter, "we Trotskyites urge the masses to take power, organising in the event of necessity military intervention in other countries from the territory of either Cuba or China."

Like the Maoists, the Trotskyites attack those who allegedly fail to give assistance to "the oppressed classes and the oppressed nations of the whole world in their revolutionary struggle," and declare that support of the revolution in the colonial countries "should not be passive, but active, direct, militant, scientific and politically consistent." Because the authors of this document had good grounds to fear that the words "scientific and politically consistent" may be misunderstood, they hastened to clarify them. It turns out that the socialist countries must "give all their might,

all their material, military and atomic resources to the support and encouragement of revolutions in the colonial countries."

This incitement to war, including atomic war, by a handful of Trotskyite provocateurs looked like another bout of wailing by the crazy advocates of world conflict. However, subsequent events showed that Mao's policy was not a very far cry from the Trotskyite advice.

The Maoist stake on a split in the international communist movement and the socialist community, and the stubborn rejection of any united action with the peace forces were interpreted by the US imperialists as a direct invitation to aggression.

China's stand on the war in Vietnam leaves no doubt that the Maoists are prepared to sacrifice the future of entire nations to promote their hegemonistic aims. They have refused to take part in a united anti-imperialist front, declaring that "they will never agree to joint action" and that "that is the way it was, is and always will be," and have been deliberately delaying the extension of assistance to the Vietnamese people.

By now many have come to realise that, but for China's stand, the USA would never have dared to escalate the war in Vietnam. This escalation is directly connected with the fact that the Mao group, confining itself to verbal threats against US imperialism, has in fact been fighting the Soviet Union, hampering the USSR and other socialist countries in rendering assistance to Vietnam, dragging out the conflict in every possible way and trying to turn the war in Vietnam into a world war.

Any initiative for peace talks, whatever its

source, is branded by Chinese propaganda as treason and deception. Any effort to secure peace in Vietnam, to damp down the flames of war is invariably declared to be a "plot of the USA and the USSR for the sake of another, Eastern Munich".

The 1965 war between Pakistan and India could have had disastrous consequences not only for these two countries. When the Soviet Union helped to put a timely stop to the military operations, and the Tashkent Agreement frustrated the sinister designs of the imperialists and opened up the way for a lasting settlement of relations between India and Pakistan, the Maoists immediately declared the Soviet Union's peaceable steps to be a deal with the US imperialists against the peoples of Pakistan.

The Maoists have declared that the USSR, if it really wanted to help Vietnam, "should start 'something' in the heart of Europe so as to engage the US forces there and to ease the plight of the national-liberation forces in Vietnam." What they would really like to see is the Soviet Union and the USA fighting each other, while they remain on the sidelines and, as the old Chinese saying goes, watch from the "mountain peak" as the "two tigers fight."

The Soviet Union, extending all-round support to the Arab states in their struggle against imperialism, did everything it could to bring about an immediate cease-fire. Meanwhile, China was hurling its thunderbolts not at the imperialists but at the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries with the clear intention of driving a wedge between the Arab states and the socialist world.

Whatever happens in the world, Mao's agents in all countries raise a shout that the Soviet Union is not revolutionary.

Mundo Obrero, newspaper of the Spanish Communists, made a very good point in this context in an article entitled, "What is the Soviet Union doing?" It said:

"If a fascist coup has taken place in Greece, these madmen shout: 'What is the Soviet Union doing?' If the Americans are continuing the escalation in Vietnam, we hear the same song.

"If we accept this oversimplified logic, the Soviet Union turns out to be to blame for all the reverses and mistakes that fall to the lot of all revolutionary forces anywhere in the world. It turns out that the USSR has the duty to make revolution for each people or to carry on its liberation war, and that any party or group which finds itself in a difficult situation has the right to involve the Soviet Union in a world thermonuclear war merely to extricate itself.

"Indeed, the reproach contained in the question 'What is the Soviet Union doing?' becomes a very convenient dodge for all the 'impatient' ones and all the 'snobs,' an excuse for any piece of passiveness or cowardice, or expression of impotence."

The newspaper is right in drawing the conclusion that all this plays into the hands of the imperialists.

Every attempt to ease international tension is declared by the Maoists in advance to be a crime against the world revolution. When, at a meeting with leaders of Latin American Communist Parties in 1959, Mao said, "None of you must fear international tension. I personally like interna-

tional tension,"¹ those who heard him say that felt that it was wrong to do so for a man claiming to be a Marxist. However, Mao's subsequent foreign policy left less and less doubt about his desire to keep the world on the brink of war.

As the Mao group's foreign policy led the country into isolation and increasingly undermined China's international prestige, while its domestic policy led to an accumulation of difficulties, the Peking leaders were more and more outspoken in putting their stake on war. The Chinese atomic bomb blast served as a signal for fanning war hysteria in the country. The prospects of socialism in China were now said to be directly dependent on a victory of world revolution; all of China's problems, all her internal contradictions could henceforth be resolved only if "the banner of Mao Tse-tung's thought flies over the whole planet."

For many years, the propaganda of war has been a prominent item in the Chinese press and radio. This propaganda, which is always intensified whenever Chinese domestic difficulties are increased, has now developed literally into a paean of praise for weapons and war. Defence Minister Lin Piao says: "War hardens the people and advances history. In this sense war is a great school." The Mao group has made no secret of its intention to have all Chinese young men graduate from that school, regardless of the incidental losses and consequences. They declare: "The cultural revolution is preparation for war." In their newspapers, the *hungweipings* write: "Because our *hungweipings* are soldiers, they will fight. We

¹ *World Marxist Review*, No. 6, 1964, p. 57.

are a powerful reserve of the heroic People's Liberation Army. We must prepare to wage world war. The great proletarian cultural revolution is a big military exercise designed to prepare for the waging of a people's war."

Instead of uniting all the forces of the present-day revolutionary process—the world socialist system, the working-class movement in the capitalist countries, and the national-liberation movement, Mao's supporters are trying to divide these forces and to range them against each other. They have in fact denied the revolutionary role of the socialist countries of Europe, and the hegemony of the proletariat, and insist that the decisive role in the struggle against imperialism is played by the national-liberation movements, which are peasant, petty-bourgeois and even bourgeois. Lin Piao writes: "In a certain sense, the present situation in the world revolution can be characterised as a situation in which the town is encircled by the village. The whole cause of the world revolution ultimately depends on the revolutionary struggle of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America."

Announcing a campaign to encircle the "world town," in which they include the socialist countries of Europe, the Maoists have left no doubt about who is to be dealt the main blow.

It is not imperialism, but the so-called revisionists that are declared to be the most dangerous enemy. Hence this slogan: "In order to defeat US imperialism, it is first necessary to put an end to international revisionism."

Having declared the socialist countries and the whole international communist movement to be accomplices of the imperialists, the Maoists felt

that they now had good reason to reduce the struggle against imperialism to purely verbal threats, concentrating their fire on the socialist countries and mounting an unprecedentedly fierce campaign against the Soviet Union.

This Maoist line has been met with unconcealed joy by the US imperialists and the aggressive forces of other countries, who have hastened to use the anti-Sovietism of the Maoists to promote their own ends, to weaken the revolutionary forces and to inflict harm on the Chinese people itself.

In contrast to the Leftist adventurists, whose stake is on war, the Communists are actively working for peace. The International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties was able to state with satisfaction that "It has been possible to prevent the outbreak of a world war thanks to the grownig economic, political and military might, and the peace-loving foreign policy of the Soviet Union and other socialist states; to the actions of the international proletariat and of all fighters against imperialism; to the struggle for national liberation; and also to the massive peace movement." ¹

The armed intervention in Vietnam, which is of especial importance for the military-political plans of imperialism, has shown that in the present epoch there is an ever greater gap between the aggressive designs of imperialism and its ability to implement them. The International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties expressed the confidence that "The social and

¹ ~~International Meeting of Communist and Workers'~~ *Parties*, pp.11-12.

political situation in the world today makes it possible to raise the anti-imperialist struggle to a new level. Decisive superiority over imperialism and the defeat of its policy of aggression and war can be secured by intensifying the offensive against it.”¹

History will never forgive those who, behind a screen of revolutionary talk, have refused to take joint action in the struggle against imperialism, and have attacked the forces that are firmly and consistently working for world peace.

¹ *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties*, p. 32

"BARRACK-ROOM COMMUNISM"

Socialist ideals have a long history. At one time they were visions of a better future and also a fantastic reflection of the surrounding reality in the questing minds of men. Even in his boldest flights of fancy man cannot quite escape reality. The socialist utopias were a reflection of the contemporary level of the productive forces and the experience mankind had accumulated.

The great revolution in socialist ideology carried out by Marx and Engels consisted in, among other things, the fact that they stripped the concepts of socialism from their mystic and sacramental veils, putting them on a solid basis and showing the social forces capable of building a new society and the real economic prerequisites already created by earlier development. Socialism was transformed from an utopia into a science.

Scientific socialism had to establish itself in struggle against many kinds of utopian views, including those which reflected peasant narrow-mindedness, and reduced socialism and communism to a "fair" division of property and the oversimplification of many aspects of personal and social life. The peasants' egalitarian aspirations played a revolutionary role in the struggle to do away with the feudal estates, but when turned into a universal principle egalitarianism becomes reactionary. In his early writings, Marx showed

that the petty-bourgeois celebration of communism, gross and egalitarian, and denying the human personality—was a far cry from real communism.

Behind the screen of talk about equality and limitation of consumption, Marx discerned envy, as “that covert form which money-grubbing assumes and in which it finds satisfaction only in another way.”¹ The urge for levelling, the idea of some sort of minimum, a definite limited standard, and the abstract rejection of the whole world of culture and civilisation, Marx said, were not at all a real assimilation of the abolished private property. Such ideas sprang “from a return to the unnatural simplicity of the poor man who has no requirements and who has not only raised himself above the level of private property, but has not even reached it.”²

Egalitarian communism sought salvation from capitalism only in the establishment of communist communes. The hostility towards science, culture and the intelligentsia, which is inherent in egalitarian communism, reflected the small peasants’ and artisans’ hatred for bourgeois society, a hatred which was coupled with despair.

Criticising Wilhelm Weitling, who preached this kind of primitive sectarian communism, Marx said in March 1846 that the incitement of fantastic hopes did not lead to the salvation of the victims but to their eventual destruction. Marx added that, “Men without a positive doctrine can do nothing, and have in fact done no-

¹ Marx and Engels. *Extracts from Early Works*, Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1956, p. 586.

² *ibid.*, p. 587.

thing up to now except noise, harmful flare-ups and destruction of the cause which they had espoused.”¹

Exposing the nihilistic attitudes of sectarian communism towards mankind’s cultural achievements, Marx wrote: “Ignorance is a demoniac force, and we fear that it will be the cause of many more tragedies.”² These words have proved to be prophetic.

Primitive discourses about the future society also went hand in hand with the revolutionary preachings of the anarchists, who propounded views diametrically opposite to those of the Marxists’ but had no scruples about referring to the *Communist Manifesto* of Marx and Engels. Anarchism, Marx remarked, “brazenly substitutes for the broad programme and grand purposes of our association its own sectarian programme and limited ideas.”³

A curious example of the anarchists’ sectarian absurdities was Nechayev’s policy-making statement, entitled “The Main Principles of the Future Social System,” which Marx and Engels said was “an excellent specimen of barrack-room communism.”

Nechayev proclaimed a society based on the principle: “produce as much as possible and consume as little as possible,” “work much in order to consume little.” There was strict regulation of man’s whole life, from the cradle to the grave.

¹ See P. Annenkov’s reminiscences of Marx in the collection of documents, *Communist League, Predecessor of the Communist International*, Moscow, Mysl Publishers, 1964, p. 72.

² Marx and Engels. *Works*, Vol. 1, p. 112, 2nd Russ. Ed.

³ Marx and Engels. *Works*, Vol. 18, p. 329, 2nd Russ. Ed.

Provision was made for everything: public bedrooms, assessors and offices, regulated education, production and consumption, compulsory manual labour, and work on pain of death. To establish such a society, the anarchists' "revolutionary catechism" required that a calculated, over-riding passion for the revolutionary cause should stamp out in the revolutionary all delicate and enfeebling sentiments of kinship, friendship, love and gratitude. The revolutionary had no need of knowledge, for he "knows only one science—the science of destruction,"¹ his weapons being violence and intimidation.

As time went on, and the productive forces developed, these wild ravings—Marx said it was hard to tell whether there was more "buffoonery or baseness" in them—lost more and more ground under the blows of crippling Marxist criticism. The organised working-class movement clearly rejected the idea of "barrack-room communism." However, it died hard, coming again to the surface in new conditions, feeding on the difficulties of the struggle for socialism, and invariably reflecting the very "revolutionary revolutionism" of the despairing petty bourgeois.

Trotskyism revived many of the features of "barrack-room communism" with its cult of violence. While Lenin emphasised that "violence is . . . alien to our ideals"² Trotsky hailed violence and intimidation, and widely resorted to them.

In a speech delivered ten days after the October Revolution, Lenin said: ". . . we have not resorted, and I hope will not resort, to the terrorism of the

¹ Marx and Engels. *Works*, Vol. 18, pp. 413-416, 2nd Russ. Ed.

² Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 23, p. 69.

French revolutionaries who guillotined unarmed men.”¹ His was a profound conviction that the victorious working class must resort to armed violence and terrorism only as a counter-measure, only when it is forced to do so by the men of the overthrown exploiting classes who refuse to lay down their arms. But Trotsky enshrined terrorism as something of a law for all wars and all revolutions. In his book, *Terrorism and Communism*, he asserted that “intimidation is a mighty means of politics, both international and domestic.” He made no distinction between war and revolution, and regarded every revolution as nothing but a war, and “war, like revolution, is based on intimidation.... Revolution operates like war: it kills individuals, and puts fear into thousands.” Trotsky is known to have applied this principle not only to the enemies of the revolution. His tours of the civil-war fronts usually entailed shootings of Red Army men which were not always justified. The Party’s Central Committee was urgently forced to revoke some of Trotsky’s repressive orders.

That the “intimidation line” is an organic part of Trotskyism and that it was not at all caused by specific, wartime circumstances, will be seen from the kind of methods Trotsky wanted the Party to use in directing the masses in peacetime.

During the temporary lull in the fighting in the spring of 1920, the Party’s Ninth Congress decided to use military units on the labour front. It was impossible to demobilise the army with transport at a standstill and the threat of an early resumption of military operations. That is why

¹ Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 26, p. 294.

there arose the need to dispatch the released armies to places where there was a massive need of manpower. This was a forced and temporary measure, which, Lenin told the Congress, was imposed by extraordinary circumstances.

However, Trotsky did not regard the militarisation of labour as a forced measure but saw military measures as being natural in socialist construction. His speech at the Congress was essentially a reflection of his deep disdain for the working people. He argued that since "according to the general rule, man seeks to avoid work, it may be said that man is a rather lazy animal," and so militarisation is required to make every worker feel that he is a labouring soldier.

The Trotskyite urge to reduce leadership of the masses to purely administrative fiat was even more pronounced when the country entered the period of peaceful socialist construction. The trade-union discussion, which the Trotskyites imposed on the Party at the end of 1920 and in early 1921, revealed all of Trotsky's anti-democratic nature as he tried to implant in the trade unions methods of command and "shake-up" of leading personnel in mass organisations from top to bottom, through the use of purely administrative methods and a "tightening of the screws."

Trotsky's speeches during the trade-union discussion and on other occasions abounded in declarations about the role of the masses in history and the necessity of maintaining bonds with them. But the CPSU was right in discerning behind these words a deep lack of faith in the masses and the urge to use nothing but methods of coercion because the Trotskyites had no use for persuasion, the Party's main method of leadership.

Lenin's assessment of the "actual differences" with Trotsky on the trade-union issue left no doubt that this implied "a different *approach* to the mass, a different way of winning it over and *keeping in touch* with it."¹

The urge for equalisation, which is so characteristic of every brand of peasant utopian socialism and "barrack-room communism" of the anarchists is also evident among the Trotskyites. Let us recall Lenin's sharp criticism during the trade-union discussion of the Trotskyite idea that "The equalisation line should be pursued in the sphere of consumption, that is, the conditions of the working people's existence as individuals. In the sphere of production, the principle of priority will long remain decisive for us." Lenin said: "This is a real theoretical muddle. It is all wrong. Priority is preference, but it is nothing without preference in consumption."²

The victory of the socialist revolution, while producing moral incentives for work which are unknown in exploiting formations, does not at all signify that material incentives disappear. When you say shock work, the workers say: let's have the bread and the clothes and the beef. "It is wrong to think that food distribution is only a matter of fairness. We must bear in mind that it is a method, an instrument, and a means of increasing output."³

Lenin said this at the Third All-Russia Food Conference in June 1921, when the country was starving. Lenin subsequently made even broader

¹ Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 32, p. 22.

² *ibid.*, p. 28.

³ *ibid.*, p. 448.

statements about material incentives for developing production, and their correct combination with moral incentives.

Meanwhile, Trotskyist-minded economists kept saying that piece-rates were a system of "bourgeois incentives for work," and argued that this could "start to hamper the new system of labour organisation."

When the Soviet Republic was just switching from the civil war to peacetime construction, Lenin wrote in his article, *New Times and Old Mistakes in a New Guise* that whenever history took one of its unexpected turns there was some change in the form of petty-bourgeois vacillation and in Right-opportunist and anarchist attitudes. In 1921, taking as a standard the war-communism policy, to which the Party had been forced to resort during the civil war, the Left-opportunists called for almost instant communism. Lenin showed the great danger of petty-bourgeois rashness and spinelessness, which objectively played into the hands of imperialism. The defeat of the Leftists saved the country from imminent upheavals, which an adventurist policy makes inevitable.

In China, the Party's Left wing managed to saddle the country with a policy akin to the proclamation of instant communism. Together with the "Great Leap Forward" slogan there was the "People's Communes" slogan. In 1958, communes were set up in the countryside at a forced pace, and were at once proclaimed to be "cells of the communist society." The peasants' personal plots, poultry and livestock were handed over to the communes. Everything was socialised, including household utensils and crockery. Ten free

kinds of maintenance were introduced, among them food, clothing, wedding expenses, funeral costs, and so on.

The leading group in the CPC adopted decisions saying that the "attainment of communism in China should apparently no longer be regarded as a thing of the distant future"; articles were published assuring readers that China would be the first socialist country to complete the transition to communism, and that of Marx's ten prerequisites for building communism, China had already implemented eight, while the other two—the integration of agriculture and industry, and of education and material production—were already being realised (*Hunchi*, 1958, No. 7). However, observers said that these communes looked very much like para-military settlements idealising poverty and self-denial.

The purely artificial establishment of these communes, ignoring the fact that their principles were absolutely out of line with the productive forces in the Chinese countryside, had the gravest economic consequences. In three of four months, the communes consumed a year's supply of rice. The peasants stopped working and there was a looming threat of famine. The communes had to be abandoned, and although Chinese propagandists continue mechanically to talk about them, the communes have in fact long ceased to exist, having given way to something like agricultural artels called production brigades.

The logic of petty-bourgeois revolutionariness impelled the Maoists to seek a way out of their difficulties through militarisation, a "tightening of the screws," and an enshrinement of violence.

All the able-bodied population of the people's

communes in town and country, including women, was organised on military lines, into platoons, companies, battalions, regiments and divisions. After this, the Maoists launched an extensive campaign under the slogan: "Learn from the People's Liberation Army."

Shortly before that, at the Eighth Congress of the CPC in 1956, it was being said that the PLA had won its victory under the Party's leadership, that the Army must learn from the people, and that "centralisation achieved through violence only is a false centralisation which cannot stand the test." Now the Maoists insisted that it is not the Army that must learn from the party and the people, but on the contrary, they must learn from it; centralisation based on violence was proclaimed a key principle.

The practical steps taken in China to militarise labour and implant military discipline show that that was not a mere propaganda campaign. A whole system of political organs vested with great powers was set up in industry and agriculture: political boards at the ministries and the large plants; political departments at the medium-sized enterprises; and political leaders at the small enterprises. All these organs were staffed with personnel trained under the military and many military men were transferred to work in the political organs of civilian organisations.

The cultural revolution, its sponsors believe, must carry militarisation to the end. The Army is entrusted with responsibility for the spring sowing and the resumption of production.

The slogan of "produce more to consume less" has also been further elaborated. The workers' legitimate demands for better material conditions

have been declared to be counter-revolutionary "economism." The Maoist propaganda machine has long been trying to produce a "theoretical basis" for the sad need to limit the working people's requirements in every way. There was a long campaign to boost people who denied themselves everything, like the cook who "for 13 years did not take a single holiday, did not buy himself a single pair of shoes or a pair of socks." The idea was being spread that "we revolutionaries must think not of clothes but of how to liberate the whole of mankind." Material incentives in the results of one's work were said to lead to bourgeois degeneration.

Now "economism" has been declared to be "corruption," a "dagger used to kill men without shedding blood, opium poisoning men, arsenic in a sugared pill." The fact that the All-China Trade Union Federation has been virtually disbanded for its "economism" and that white- and blue-collar workers have been deprived of any organisations to express their material and spiritual needs shows that labour organisations are being dealt real and not metaphorical knife stabs.

The "cultural revolution," during which schools and colleges were closed to relieve the hungweipings from the burden of studies, brought the idea that serious knowledge was superfluous. In early 1964, Mao Tse-tung, according to a hungweiping handbill, told a group of students: "The curriculum can be halved. Confucius taught only six arts: ceremonial, music, archery, chariot driving, the reading of the classics and arithmetic... If you take men in history who had scholarship, you will find no outstanding leaders among them. Under the Ming dynasty things

went well only with two emperors, Tai Tsu and Cheng Tsu. One of them did not know any hieroglyphs, and the other knew very few. If you have read many books, you won't become an emperor." This handbill in praise of ignorance was widely circulated in China.

Soon came an official announcement of shorter terms of instruction in the institutes, and the abolition of many subjects; where classes were resumed they began with military training and the singing of the song "The East Is Red."

The oversimplified ideal of impoverished man, stripped of his natural feelings or needs is not at all a surprising outcome of the artificial constructions of "barrack-room communism."

Terence's famous saying "*Homo sum, humani nil a me alienum puto*" (I am a man, I count nothing human indifferent to me), a saying which Marx readily accepted, is essentially being rooted out in China as the worst kind of sedition.

Say, a character in a Soviet work of fiction, a courageous fighter and war hero, happens to think about his wife and children. Maoist literary critics brand him as a traitor who cares for nothing but his family. The commander dare not regret the loss of his men because they are dying for a great purpose.

The feelings of grief, suffering, torment and sorrow felt by Soviet people, who went through all the horrors of the Nazi occupation but who never bowed down or stopped fighting, are declared by the Maoists to be "bourgeois emotions" of "petty despicable people." According to the "barrack-room communism" scheme it is a crime, while rejoicing at the victory over the fascists, to sorrow for the dead; to be prepared for self-

sacrifice, but to go on loving one's wife and children; to display fearlessness in battle, but to fail to conceal one's joy when the shooting stops; to work for a lofty social ideal, but to fail to deny an interest in obtaining more of the good things of life.

High-handed interference in man's personal life and constant control over everyone are becoming universal. In reply to a letter protesting against the stipulation that a communist could marry only after his application had been examined by party bodies at three levels, *Jenmin jihpao* wrote on January 12, 1957, that it was the duty of Party organisations "to help those wishing to marry to learn of each other's political views so as to avoid misunderstandings on this ground and any possible unfortunate consequences." The paper explained that Party organisations must give advice not only on the question of the future spouse's political views, but on other matters as well," and to help their members to "gain a better knowledge of the character and mentality of the future spouse."

This set of "instructions" gives no hint at all about such sentiments as love and affection. Since then, the Maoist "barrack-room communism" ideology has assumed even more concrete forms. Love is now called an "instinct of attraction to the opposite sex," and is declared to be a most harmful expression of bourgeois individualism.

In China, the idea of the hegemony of the working class and the dictatorship of the proletariat have lost their true meaning. Hundreds of thousands of people subjected to "re-education" are being dispatched to the countryside but never to workers' collectives. The different living stand-

ards among workers and peasants are used to incite the peasants against the workers and to accuse the working class of a striving to "bourgeoisify" itself. Some observers with a good knowledge of the country say that "the treatment given to the working class in China now and again reminds one of that given to the bourgeoisie in the Soviet Union." The loudly advertised "experience" of the Taching oil fields, called a "Chinese-type socialist enterprise" boils down to an attempt to get the workers to take care of their own supplies. The good thing about the workers in Taching is said to be that they have built their own dugouts or huts of cane and reeds. While the worker is engaged in production, the members of his family farm. That is presented as the ideal.

The intention of making the worker a part-time peasant is also being carried out in other ways. Under contracts signed with villages, enterprises recruit workers for a season or for a period of three to seven years. These workers are paid less than permanent workers and a part of their wages goes to a village commune's social fund. In some instances the workers are paid by the village in accordance with the number of their work-day units. The workers are not allowed to take their families along with them, and as soon as their term runs out they must return to the villages. The Chinese press, writing up these practices, stresses that "The system of permanent workers is incompatible with Chairman Mao's thought."

Chinese reality shows that the petty bourgeoisie can be an ally of the working class but it can also act against it, investing the word "proletarian"—a symbol of the revolutionary spirit in the modern

world—with its own narrow primitive ideals.

Petty-bourgeois narrow-mindedness is being implanted in China everywhere, and not only in internal life. It has been set up as a state policy, including foreign policy. The Chinese leaders would like to supplement equalisation at home with equalisation between the socialist countries. Their logic is that the Soviet Union should suspend the construction of communism and throw all its resources into pulling up the lagging countries.

If the Soviet Union and the other economically advanced socialist countries were in fact to stop building the material and technical basis of communism and socialism they would deprive the peoples of the developing countries of the possibility of obtaining the assistance they need.

The petty-bourgeois, peasant urge to “snatch a bigger slice for oneself” stems from the Mao group, which not only refuses to consider the interests of the world socialist system as a whole, but is prepared for the sake of equalisation to deprive the world revolutionary movement, about which it has talked so much, of its main material base—the economic and military strength of the socialist camp.

Socialism has travelled a tortuous path from utopia to science. Now Mao wants it to run back, from science to reactionary utopia. But history cannot be reversed. Its advance can be hampered, but what is rooted in life will make its way despite every obstacle. Besides, the greater the pressure applied to the spring of history, the greater the energy it accumulates, so that when it is released it hurls the antagonistic forces out of its way.

IDOLATRY

The anarchists, who refused to have any sort of state power, carried on a wild campaign against authority. By contrast, the Narodniks who borrowed a great deal from the anarchists, glorified authority, "heroes" capable of liberating the "mob". The Trotskyites insist on their intolerance of the personality cult. In China, the worship of Mao has been carried to the extreme of a frenzied fanaticism. This seems to imply two diametrically opposed approaches. But a comparison of the methods used by petty-bourgeois revolutionists of every stripe brings out their common features, which are connected with what is known as the "personality cult." There is good reason why they have these common features. Among the petty producers, the lumpen proletarians, the intellectuals gone to seed, and all the social sections which constitute the social base of petty-bourgeois revolutionariness, outbursts of wildly mutinous behaviour alternate with acceptance of fate or hopes for the arrival of a "strong, fair-minded" man who will arrange matters in the best way.

The Russian autocracy not only drowned peasant uprisings in blood, but for a long time also successfully played on the naive peasant faith in the good tsar. Bonapartism always looked to the peasantry's acquisitive, conservative instincts. In consolidating the power of the monopolies, Hitler

made skilful use of the despair of the petty-bourgeois mass, thrown out of balance by the crisis, and also a section of the most backward workers.

In the history of social movements, it was petty-bourgeois backwardness and narrow-mindedness that was the leaven of many leaders' authority.

From the start Marxism has had to contend with the penetration into the working-class movement of alien morals and illusions, including those which pave the way for the personality cult.

The Marxists' struggle against subjectivism, which is inherent to every brand of petty-bourgeois revolutionariness, has always been a struggle against exaggerating the possibilities of leaders and individuals in the liberation movement. It is subjectivism that breeds among leaders a sense of infallibility and intolerance of any dissenting opinion. Perhaps this explains why over the ages men of quite different stature, distinct as personalities, but possessed by the same subjectivism, appear to bear the same stamp.

Among the men who propounded socialism before the Marxist period many claimed the role of prophet and were enamoured of their own teaching. Indeed, megalomania was a prominent feature of many petty-bourgeois Socialists, regardless of the size of their following, and it has become something like a personal characteristic.

We find virtually a collective characteristic of this type of man, with which the working-class movement has to contend even today, in a letter written to Marx by Karl Schapper, a leader of the League of the Just. In June 1846, he wrote about Weitling, an ideologist of "egalitarian" communism, whose views were popular among German workers and artisans when the German

proletariat was just emerging. Schapper wrote: "Wilhelm Weitling can get along only with those who blindly obey his orders, and who do not think any book interesting unless it has been written by Weitling. He believes that he alone is in possession of the truth and can save the world, and that everything written by other men is so much rubbish. That is why he has studied nothing and does not want his followers to study anything either—they must be content with his scriptures."¹

With his megalomania, Weitling fancied he saw rivals, intriguers and enemies lurking everywhere, and this was reflected in the Statutes of the League of the Just. That is what Marx had in mind when he wrote that when he and Engels were joining the secret Communist Society which was taking over from the League, they had stipulated that "everything tending to encourage superstitious belief in authority was to be removed from the statutes."²

Marx and Engels secured the removal of all the rules of the League under which the admission of new members had been something of a semi-mystical ritual including the swearing of an oath, and had threatened inexorable revenge against those breaking the oath of secrecy. They secured the removal of everything that infringed the rights of rank-and-file members and made it possible for the leaders to act despotically.

The new Rules were based on the principles of centralism and democratism, and in particular

¹ Y. P. Kandel. *Marx and Engels, the Organisers of the Communist League*, Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1953, p. 126.

² Marx and Engels. *Selected Correspondence*, p. 310.

provided for the accountability of elective bodies.

During the period of the International Working Men's Association, Marx, "loathing any kind of personality cult," never allowed the publication of the numerous messages which spoke of his services, and never replied to them, although now and again he rebuked their authors for sending them in.

What a contrast this was to the self-exaltation of Bakunin, who claimed the role of infallible pope of the revolutionary movement. Bakunin rejected all other authorities and demanded implicit obedience to himself, fiercely attacking anyone who did not bend to his will. In their work, *The International Social-Democratic Alliance, and the International Working Men's Association*, Marx and Engels analysed the ideology and practices of anarchism, and showed that Bakunin's fine talk about democratic practices was designed to establish his own dictatorship in the Alliance.

Lenin likewise had to fight against dictatorial anarchist leadership. He exposed the ideology which rejected authority in words, but in fact led to the establishment of an oligarchy by a handful of leaders. The principle of "voluntary agreement" between members of the organisation which the anarchists put forward to counter the democratic "subordination of the minority to the majority" principle only meant that the "leaders" were controlled in no way and were free to enter into all sorts of combinations with each other. The anarchist advocacy of "absolute freedom" inevitably led to the personality cult, because the "personality" himself laid down the limits of his rights and duties and the nature of his acts and deeds.

Trotsky's petty-bourgeois anarchist individualism became evident in its ugly form even before the revolution, when he was fighting against Bolshevik organisational principles, and became even more pronounced after the victory of the revolution. Like the anarchists, the Trotskyites covered up their anti-democratic nature with a paean of praise to democracy. They strove hard to create the impression that they were fighters against the personality cult, and that is the story being actively spread throughout the world by all the reactionaries, but it is a very far cry from the truth.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is guided by Marxism-Leninism and considers the personality cult to be deeply antagonistic to the democratic nature of socialist society. At the 20th Congress, the Soviet Communists resolutely condemned Stalin's personality cult, which was expressed in the exaggeration of the role of one man, which is totally alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, in departures from the Leninist principle of collective leadership, in unjustified repressions and other violations of socialist legality. These distortions, however grave, did nothing to change the nature of socialist society or to shake the foundations of socialism. The Party and the Soviet people had an abiding faith in the cause of communism and worked with enthusiasm to implement Lenin's ideals, to overcome the difficulties and make good the temporary setbacks and mistakes.

After the 20th Congress of the CPSU, the Fourth International tried to create the impression that condemnation of Stalin's mistakes showed that Trotsky had been right. The reactionary

press throughout the world threw itself into the propaganda campaign aimed at presenting the Trotskyites as fighters against the personality cult. Perhaps never before had the bourgeois newspapers carried so many portraits of Trotsky, extracts from his writings, episodes from his life, etc. This loud campaign soon petered out, though now and again efforts are made to revive it. It is much too obvious that the Trotskyites did not fight the cult of Stalin, as they now want people to believe, but against the CPSU, which was pursuing its policy of socialist construction.

The anti-communist propaganda build-up of Trotsky's personality merely goes to show that the CPSU had been right in fighting Trotskyism, without whose defeat successful socialist construction would have been impossible.

Trotsky's style had always been one of administration by fiat, but one may well ask this question: how can this be so when all the years after Lenin's death he had fought against the Party under the pretext of extending democracy? The answer is easily found, although the Trotskyites are now trying very hard to maintain the myth created by their predecessors about Trotsky's having been a fighter against the Party machine, "Stalin's bureaucracy," and so on. Trotsky was much too subtle and experienced a politician and his demagogic and ingratiating appeals to the young were clearly designed to spread anarchist ideas of democracy, and create a false antithesis between democracy and leadership.

In attacking the Party machine, Trotsky was not at all opposed to any machine whatsoever (his own practices leave no doubt at all on this score). He was opposed to the given machine,

the apparatus safeguarding Leninism, and wanted to set up his own Trotskyite machine. Criticising internal Party practices, Trotsky did not at all yearn for genuine democracy. He was merely doing what he had done so often in the past, and what had given Lenin ground to say about him and other factionalists that they "recognise the will of the majority of the class-conscious workers, *not* in the present, but in the future, only in the future event of the workers agreeing with them." ¹

Trotskyite methods leave no doubt that they are the methods most reminiscent of those of the personality cult. In his efforts to set himself up on a pedestal, Trotsky never lost an opportunity to build himself up, heaping scorn on everyone who failed to become one of his followers.

The whole tenor of his book, *My Life*, suggests that the CPSU had lost a great deal by rejecting him as a leader, and that it would have profited by installing him at the top. However, every fair-minded reader will find himself resenting, from the very first pages, the disgusting boastfulness of this man, who had a mania of infallibility. We find that as a child, long before reading any of Marx's books, Trotsky had been a Marxist, and when he later came to read these books, he "modestly" admits, he found in the works of Marx, Engels, Plekhanov and Mehring "confirmation of what I thought I had guessed on my own in prison." Subsequently, when reading the correspondence of Marx and Engels, he discovered that he had "not only a theoretical but

¹ Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 20, p. 483.

also a psychological similarity with the founders of Marxism."

Today, we find in China a display of the personality cult next to which all the other personality cults in history pale into insignificance. This peasant country, where the cult of the emperor—"father of the Celestial Empire"—had reigned for centuries, retains many conditions for the worship of idols.

Mao alone is credited with all the achievements of the Communist Party and the Chinese people, all the victories of the revolution and construction. The press controlled by the Maoists never mentions the names of those who had founded the Party, and its full history is interpreted in such a way as to glorify Mao alone. All the Party decisions merely give concrete form to his ideas, expressing the "highest wisdom of the Chinese people." Hordes of propagandists vie with each other in quest of epithet or metaphor to glorify Mao. At first he was compared to the sun, and then it turned out that there were two red suns in the world, "one in the heavens, and the other down here, among men." Eventually this proved to be inadequate, and we find that "the sun rises and sets, but Chairman Mao's works always radiate light."

Mao's writings have long been presented as a kind of "golden key" which helps to solve any problems, big and small, including the merest trifles in anyone's personal life. All the mistakes made in economic policy, which can no longer be ignored, are explained very simply: they were made by those who had misunderstood and misapplied Mao's "brilliant directions." However, success is guaranteed in all things if one does

what the press has been drumming into the heads of the people: "Read Chairman Mao's books, obey Chairman Mao, act on Chairman Mao's directions, be Chairman Mao's good fighter."

The surgeon who has performed a successful operation or the athlete who has set a record has only one secret: the press keeps saying that he has studied Chairman Mao's works and has been the Chairman's true disciple. Chairman Mao's instructions even help one to sell water-melons in the town square.

For many years now there has been an uninterrupted campaign for the study of Mao's works. The press carries reports about teams which had had some poor workmanship, but began to produce top quality goods only after reading Chairman Mao's works; there is encouragement of the study of his works by the family at home, and the inclusion into study circles of new arrivals who stay at hotels for more than six days; great praise is showered on those who believe that after working hours one's time is not one's own but that "leisure should be revolutionised," which again means the study of Mao's works; the model person is sure that "one may go without sleep and food, but not without reading Chairman Mao's works."

For years now the papers have been carrying articles about those who find odd moments during the day to read more of Chairman Mao's writings. Peasant women, for instance, are advised to use these "slots": "the rainy day, the time for rest, the time before and after a meeting, the time of suckling the child, the time of putting the child to bed, the time before cooking the food; plus the time of study established by the Party cell."

Pablo Neruda, the outstanding Chilean poet

and publicist, and a great friend of the Chinese revolution, wrote with bitterness: "You will find a portrait of Mao Tse-tung in every street and on every door. Mao Tse-tung has become a living Buddha kept apart from the people by the court bonzes, who interpret Marxism and modern history according to his wishes. The peasants bow and kneel before the leader's portrait. Is that communism? It looks more like ridiculous, inadmissible, mystical and religious worship. . . The personality cult in China is leading to tragic consequences."

That was written several years before the so-called cultural revolution. Today, Mao's religious worship has assumed really monstrous proportions. The Chinese press will quote a man as saying: "Come quick and shake hands with me, my hands have just touched those of Chairman Mao." Chairman Mao's thoughts have been set to music and are sung like psalms. They are memorised in nursery schools, chanted at meetings and read out like prayers before taking off on a flight. Anyone who wants to prove his loyalty and to show that he is solidly behind the Chairman must have the texts committed to memory.

In 1922, Lenin criticised the Left-wing doctrinaires because often "instead of soberly weighing up the situation that was not very favourable for immediate and direct revolutionary action, they vigorously indulged in the waving of little red flags."¹

That was a metaphor, but today this waving of little red flags in place of a sober policy is ac-

¹ Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 33, p. 208.

tually being practiced in China. Instead of the little red flags they are using Mao's little red books.

In 1958, Mao wrote: "One obvious feature of the 600-million strong Chinese people, apart from its other features, is poverty and the fact that it is a clean sheet of paper. At first sight this is bad, but actually it is good. Poverty makes it yearn for change, makes it act and make revolution. There is nothing on the clean sheet of paper, and on it may be written the newest and most beautiful words, may be drawn the newest and most beautiful pictures." Everyone sees what kind of beautiful pictures Mao has been drawing, and what he wants to do with a great people.

The Mao group's strident insistence on loyalty to the so-called line of the masses cannot conceal its own lack of faith in the masses, because those who do not tell the masses the truth even when they try to ingratiate themselves with the masses and extol them to the very skies merely show that they do not believe in the masses.

Indeed, as Mao's policy met with growing resistance, it became increasingly clear that Mao trusted only in his own dictatorship, which relied on the army, and that he was prepared to go to any lengths to achieve his aims. Mao's profoundly voluntarist slogan, "Politics is the commanding force," was put forward to justify the possibility of action in every sphere of economic life in the teeth of the objective laws, and the possibility of issuing any kinds of orders to his subordinates.

In April, 1969, 13 years after the Eighth Congress of the CPC, Mao finally decided to risk calling the so-called Ninth Congress. The delegates were not elected but handpicked, most of

them coming from the Army, which has become the mainstay of the regime.

Although the Rules adopted by the Congress speak about democratic centralism, nothing is said about the deadlines for calling Congresses and CC Plenary Meetings; nor is any provision made for the rights of Party members. Henceforth Mao will not have to break the Rules to engage in his anti-democratic practices: these have been "legalised." This set of Rules, which is shot through with the personality cult spirit, contains an amazing clause: Lin Piao is declared to be Mao's successor. The hereditary principle of the imperial dynasties has been supplanted by Mao's designation of his successor in his lifetime. Mao's successor, giving the report at the "Ninth Congress," declared: "The whole Party will condemn and the whole country will chastise anyone who dares oppose Chairman Mao Tse-tung, oppose Mao Tse-tung's thought, whatever the time and place."

The personality cult practices are doing the people's interests much harm, and are hampering the struggle against imperialism and the struggle for socialism. However, the personality cult blinds not only the worshippers but also the idol himself. In his efforts to assure himself of immortality, Mao has been pouring so much oil on the flames of history that the myths he has created will be incinerated sooner or later.

ANY MEANS WILL DO

Social psychology has yet to explain why renegades tend to become the fiercest opponents of the views and organisations they betray, and why they surpass in hatred and intolerance even those who have always been on the other side of the barricades. Are they motivated by a desire to atone for their sins, to salve the wounds of thwarted ambition, or to voice a feeling of sour grapes? However that may be, from Biblical times to this day renegades and traitors have usually been the most rabid haters of the banner to which they had once sworn the oath of allegiance.

There are many examples of this in the history of the working-class movement, showing that as petty-bourgeois revolutionists suffer defeats and lose their positions in the working class, they tend to face about in their struggle and aim their blows not against the exploiting system (on which they merely heap curses) but against workers' organisations.

The anarchists started their conspiratorial subversive activity against the First International when they lost hope of securing leadership and getting it to accept their views. A letter from the General Council addressed to all members of the International Working Men's Association, which was drafted by Engels in August 1872, said: "For

the first time in the history of the working-class struggle we are faced with a conspiracy within the working class itself, whose aim is not to explode the existing exploiting system but the Association, which is carrying on a most vigorous struggle against this system. This is a conspiracy aimed against the proletarian movement itself.”¹

The struggle against this conspiracy showed that there is a connection between the ideology and the methods of every political trend, a fact that has since been confirmed by the history of the working-class movement.

One needs merely page through the drama-packed pages of the struggle between anarchism and Marxism in the latter half of the 19th century to see not only the gap between their ideologies, but also the contrast between their methods of internal party struggle. The Marxists’ principled yet flexible line and their discipline and loyalty to collectively adopted decisions contrasts with the anarchists’ high-handed disregard of the opinion of others, of disciplined organisation, and their lack of common decency in dealing with those who take a different view. To achieve their aims, the anarchists did not scruple to use any means, including lies, slanders, intimidation and assault—anything that served their purpose. The secret conspiratorial society set up within the International directed “its blows not against the existing governments, but against revolutionaries who refused to accept its dogmas and leadership.”²

If all this does seem to be relevant to the

¹ Marx and Engels. *Works*, Vol. 18, p. 114, 2nd Russ. Ed.

² *ibid.*, p. 329.

present day, reminding one of the usual methods used by the Trotskyites, the reason is that the methods used by the petty-bourgeois revolutionists in fighting against the proletarian revolution, while being modified depending on time and place, have basically remained the same and are expressed by the simple but deeply unscrupulous formula: all is fair in war.

What then are the methods the petty-bourgeois revolutionists have been using against Marxism and how is this struggle usually escalated, to use a well-worn term?

As a rule it starts with factionalism, the ignoring of collective decisions, the denial of any duty to one's comrades in the struggle, and the acceptance of the will of the majority only when it coincides with the factionalists' own views. The anarchists used to say that there are no limits to the rights of individuals, and Trotskyism has "enriched" this assertion by declaring there to be no limits to the freedom to set up factions.

Before the 1917 Revolution, the Trotskyites covered up their factional activity by pretending to be superior to factionalism, and masking their splitting activity by talk of unity, which is why Lenin exposed them as the most dangerous factionalists, and branded Trotsky a Judas. Once the revolution had won, the Trotskyites increasingly came out into the open as a faction claiming to supplant the Leninist Party.

In that period, it was characteristic of Trotskyism that it carried on its factional fight not only at home, but also in the international arena. Its emissaries went to the Communist Parties of Germany, France and other countries to set up within the working-class movement a bloc of all

the opposition groups, regardless of their political complexion, so long as they served the Trotskyites' purpose.

All these methods of factional fighting on an international scale have been fully adopted by the Maoists. There was good reason why they objected to condemnation of factionalism at the 1960 Moscow Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties. Still, the Conference included a clause in its Statement saying that any acts which could undermine the unity of the international communist movement were intolerable. The CPC's leading group has ignored this.

Wherever possible, Peking's representatives have cobbled factional groups whose task is to disorganise the normal activity of the leadership elected by the Party Congress.

One method the Trotskyites frequently used in their fight against the Communist Parties was to try to set the rank-and-file membership at odds with the Party leadership, and to concentrate their fire on those who expressed the Party's line. This method has been fully adopted by the Chinese leaders in their fight against the CPSU and other Communist Parties; they have also tried to oppose the Parties to their Central Committees, and to sling dirt on Party leaders.

The "Fourth International" Trotskyites have made no secret of their delight over these subversive activities, and have urged the Maoists to promote the split "by all the available means: money, men, equipment." On February 8, 1963, the "Fourth International," believing that the Chinese splitters' destructive efforts had good prospects, began to talk about the establishment of a new communist international "whose need

has been confirmed, as never before, by the latest events, and for whose establishment the Fourth International has been working since its own foundation."

Before the Trotskyites were expelled from the communist ranks, they had been in the habit of trying to carry the discussion of any differences outside the Party.

Mao Tse-tung has acted in roughly the same way. In April 1960, even before the differences in the communist movement had been discussed, Peking put out in all the main languages of the world a booklet entitled *Long Live Leninism!* which was directed against the line collectively worked out by the Communist Parties in 1957. Since then, Chinese delegates have been making splitting speeches in all the non-party international mass organisations, including the Peace Council, the Organisation of Afro-Asian Solidarity, the World Youth Forum, the World Women's Congress, and so on. The Maoists have been using any available channel to spread their ideas through the mass media.

The Trotskyites have always conducted polemics in a tone deliberately ruling out the possibility of any settlement of differences. They have never tried discussion or persuasion, but have always used ultimatums and threats, in an effort to crush their opponents. Back in 1904, Lenin said that this was an attempt to destroy, not to convince, a method which showed lack of consistent principles, lack of faith in one's own ideas.¹

Petty-bourgeois revolutionists disgraced themselves in the eyes of all honest men, not only

¹ See Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 7, p. 364.

because they were unscrupulous in their methods but also because they coalesced with the working people's enemies.

The Trotskyites started their subversive activity in the Soviet Union, and in the mid-1920s were prepared to establish the most disreputable connections in order to set up an illegal printing shop. With the Soviet Union facing an armed attack by the imperialist powers, the Trotskyites put forward a slogan of conditional defencism, which meant a virtual abandonment of defence of the USSR, unless its policy was altered.

That this was more than mere talk was clear from the way the Trotskyites behaved in other countries. At the most critical period of the Civil War in Spain, the Trotskyites staged an uprising in Barcelona against the republican government, motivating their betrayal by the plea that the war was being fought only for democracy and not for socialism. The Trotskyites did everything to spread defeatist attitudes and depress morale in the Republican part of Spain. Franco's agents made wide use of subversive activity by the Trotskyites and the anarchists for their own ends.

In its splitting activity, the Mao group has gone all the way to supporting the most reactionary regimes. In Spain, where the Communists have to work deep underground because of the savage reprisals, the authorities willingly circulate all Peking publications. Moreover, in such provocations as the publication of forged issues of the communist newspaper *Mundo Obrero*, the fascists have had recourse to Peking's assistance. Thus, the special branch of Franco's Ministry of Information helped to circulate a bulletin entitled *Mundo Obrero Revolucionario*, which claimed to

be the organ of a "new" Communist Party of Spain. It called the Communist Party leaders "revisionists," "capitulationists" and "social-democratic reformists." The main purpose of the bulletin was to bring about a split in the successfully developing anti-fascist movement in Spain. The democratic press is right in saying that the facilities made available to the bulletin by the Spanish authorities indicate that there is a virtual alliance between the fascist dictatorship and Peking propaganda in Spain.

The same thing is happening in the FRG, which has become a centre from which Maoist literature is being distributed to other European countries. Max Reimann, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany, told the International Conference of Communists in 1969: "We Communists in the Federal Republic see daily how the government encourages official Mao groups and uses them to split the anti-imperialist front for its own ends. While our Party is outlawed and the activities of the democratic forces are impeded at every step, the Mao splinter groups are accorded freedom of action." ¹

In 1968, a sub-committee of the US House of Representatives recommended the appropriate US agencies to use Left, even ultra Left, anti-communist elements in fighting Latin American Communist Parties. ²

In Peru, Left-opportunist splitters, organised and led by the Maoists, acted, in effect, in collu-

¹ *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties*, p. 180.

² *ibid.*, p. 337.

sion with the police. They made use of the large-scale raids staged by the military junta against the Communists in 1963. The subversive elements were soon released, while the Leninist-Communists were kept in prison for a long time.¹

General Secretary of the Guadeloupe Communist Party Evremond Gene, read out at the Meeting an extract from a resolution of his Politburo stating that colonialism "*helps the emergence of Leftist tendencies and groups, honeycombed with colonial agents operating hand in glove with traitors of the labour movement and all manner of adventurers acting in the interests of the capitalist coterie closely linked with American imperialism.*"²

Hundreds of offices in Latin American capitals post to private addresses letters, pamphlets and all kinds of statements spreading Mao's thoughts. News agencies actively distribute Maoist documents, and also those of pro-Peking splinter groups. In many countries, the bourgeois press, which had never published anything about the Communist Parties, has been carrying extensive reports about the activity of Mao's followers.

In the new situation and on another scale this is exactly what happened at the very early stages of the Marxist struggle against petty-bourgeois revolutionariness. While members of the First International were persecuted and arrested in almost every country, the members of the conspiratorial Alliance enjoyed quite exceptional immunity.³

¹ *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties*, pp. 420-421.

² *ibid.*, p. 495.

³ Marx and Engels. *Works*, Vol. 18, p. 114, 2nd Russ. Ed.

Marx used to say that the anarchists' extreme views could scare only "bourgeois cretins," whereas sober-minded bourgeois politicians realised very well the benefits they could derive from the anarchists' ultra-revolutionary twaddle. The secret police in various states resorted to diverse means of encouraging the "ultra-revolutionaries." Thus, on December 30, 1871, a special commissar of the Swiss police reported on the activity of the anarchist newspaper *Revolution sociale*, which by its antics had, he believed, "undoubtedly undermined the foundations of the International much more thoroughly than the wisest writings could have done... It would be unpleasant to have this newspaper... suspend publication." He proposed the allocation of the necessary funds "to give the paper a new lease of life," "to enable it to step up its destructive and disorganising activity within the ranks of the Swiss internationalists."

In the 1920s and 1930s, while the imperialist reactionaries still had hopes of a Trotskyite success, they were generous in financing Trotskyite publications. In some countries, the authorities distributed Trotskyite writings at enterprises and among political prisoners in jails. While the Communists were subjected to savage reprisals, the Trotskyites were given a free hand. The Trotskyites were naturally given support because their malicious attacks and slanders against the world's first socialist country surpassed anything the anti-Communists could invent.

At one period of the struggle against Trotskyism, before the revolution, Lenin said that the methods used by Trotsky's supporters were those

of "impotent little groups, who are angry at their own impotence." ¹

Of course, the possibilities open to these little groups bear no comparison to those of Mao's supporters. At the head of a big state, they are able to build up their subversive activity to unprecedented proportions. Nevertheless, it remains true that abuse is an indication of intrinsic weakness, for it is a weapon used by the impotent who are angry at their own impotence.

The methods traditionally used by various trends in petty-bourgeois revolutionariness largely serve to discredit the very ideas these methods are designed to implant. Base methods in the struggle open the eyes of those who had believed in the latter-day prophets and who had had some illusions. The methods used by the anarchists in fighting Marxism antagonised many of their supporters. When the Trotskyites finally emerged as double-dealers and provocateurs, they found themselves in a social vacuum. When progressive men all over the world compare Peking's provocative polemics with the self-restraint and sense of dignity displayed by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Soviet people and the whole communist movement, they feel a deep sense of respect for those who have been consistently and confidently standing up for the purity of their convictions.

BELLICOSE NATIONALISM

In opposing proletarian internationalism, petty-bourgeois revolutionists bring out either a narrow nationalism or cosmopolitanism. At the very early stages of their activity, Marx and Engels had to criticize the narrow national views of German artisans about German culture as being the be-all and end-all of world history, and of the German nation as the model nation. In Italy, the anarchists argued that the Italian people, the most revolutionary people, had the mission of showing other nations the way they were to liberate themselves. The Russian anarchists held that the Slavs had a special revolutionary and historical mission. All these were different versions of the same national narrow-mindedness and an inflated national sense of importance.

Trotskyite ideology is essentially cosmopolitan. It denies that national movements have any importance, and holds that "national interests" are purely bourgeois. Trotsky used the words "patriotism" and "nation" only in a derogatory sense. In 1923, he asserted that the national questions of backward nations could no longer be of any independent importance.

For the Trotskyites, a man's country and its future are only an element of the "grandiose historical competition on whose outcome the destiny of mankind depends." And because "no major is-

sue is confined to the national framework and can be solved only on an international scale," the Trotskyites' national nihilism turns out to be a justification of the necessity of war to "bring happiness" to the working people of other countries. In this way the Trotskyite denial of the "national question" turns out to be an arrogation of the right to decide the destiny of other nations, which objectively makes it one with great-power chauvinism.

China's specific historical development explains why nationalism has such strong roots in the country. With its ancient culture, China was for a long time out of touch with other nations having an equal or superior culture. The isolation of a thousand years, the seclusion of its life, bred a suspicion of foreigners and all things foreign, and helped to spread racism, reactionary ideas about the special mission of the yellow race and the cultural superiority of the "Celestial Empire" over the rest of the world.

The Manchu dynasty established in China in the early 17th century resulted in a situation, said Marx, in which "hatred of foreigners and their expulsion from the empire, earlier occurring only because of China's geographical and ethnic features, became a political system."¹ When in the 19th century foreign capital began its intrusion into China and "the barbarous and hermetical isolation" of that "living fossil . . . from the civilised world was broken," as Marx put it, the feeling of nationalism was sharpened by the oppression to which the country was subjected. All

¹ Marx and Engels. *Works*, Vol. 9, pp. 103-104, 2nd Russ. Ed.

this necessarily left its mark on the ideology of the petty-bourgeoisie, including those of its sections from which came some members of the Communist Party.

When the Communist Party of China was being established, the Communists regarded the struggle to overcome nationalistic ideas as their most important task. Li Ta-chao, one of the founders of the CPC, wrote at the time: "The peasants do not know what imperialism means, but they know the foreigners who personify it. Our task is to explain to them the nature of imperialism, which oppresses China and exploits the Chinese peasantry, and to direct their wrath against it. This will make it possible gradually to overcome the peasants' narrow nationalistic consciousness and help them to understand that the revolutionary workers' and peasants' masses of the world are their friends."¹

When the Communist Party was forced to switch its activity to the countryside, nationalistic tendencies, which reflected the feelings of the peasants, became stronger even among the Communists themselves. The masses saw that foreigners were at the back of the Chinese reactionaries. Chiang Kai-shek was abundantly supplied with foreign weapons, equipment, instructors and military advisers.

The victory of the people's national-liberation revolution in China naturally produced a great upsurge of national self-awareness, national pride and an overcoming of the "preconceptions of na-

¹ Li Ta-chao. *Selected Articles and Speeches*, Moscow, Nauka Publishers, 1965, p. 287.

tional egoism and national narrow-mindedness," which were so potent in countries long under foreign oppression.

It cannot be said that none of the Chinese Communist leaders at the time saw the danger of a nationalistic degeneration, but the voices of those who realised the dangers of great-power chauvinism were increasingly suppressed. The Mao group, which won the upper hand in the Party leadership, started to erase from the people's minds everything that could develop a sense of internationalism and friendship with other nations, and began to cultivate chauvinism. This was applied both to the minorities at home and to other nations.

China is a multinational country with over 50 nationalities (other than the Chinese) totalling almost 43 million. Although the non-Chinese peoples live in compact masses, they have no right to self-determination. In contrast with the Soviet Union, where the nationalities question has been solved on the basis of the Leninist principle of complete equality of nations and recognition of their right to self-determination, including secession and establishment of independent states, the Chinese policy is to break up the minorities.

Autonomy is formally held out to these peoples but it is implemented only within small administrative units, the largest of which is the autonomous region. Of these there are five in China, but their boundaries are artificially hemmed in through the establishment of autonomous areas and smaller administrative units. Thus, the Tibetan Autonomous Region borders on nine autonomous areas also inhabited by Tibetans. The

Chuan people also live in a compact mass, but are not united in a common autonomy.

This kind of fragmentation is carried out deliberately and is designed to promote the great-power purpose of maintaining an actual inequality of nations and their forcible assimilation. The journal *Hsientsien hunchi* wrote in 1960 about the need to merge all the nationalities with one nationality as the backbone. It added: "In the context of China, the Chinese must be such a backbone." The newspaper *Hsientsien jihpao* declared that "Those who oppose such assimilation, oppose socialism and communism, oppose historical materialism."

In practice what is declared to be socialism, communism and historical materialism turns out to be pure nationalism. The areas inhabited by non-Chinese nationalities are intensively settled with Chinese, the culture of the minorities is being sinicised. The Mongolians are being told that "the Mongolian language, written and spoken, has a short destiny," and their desire to learn their native tongue is condemned as "revisionism" and an attempt to avoid studying Mao's thoughts. The hungweipings savagely attacked Ulanfu, a well-known Mongolian revolutionary, First Secretary of the CPC Committee and Chairman of the People's Committee of the Autonomous Region of Inner Mongolia, for urging the study of the Mongolian language.

The idea of "Great China" or "great Han" chauvinism, against the danger of which the CPC had earlier warned, has been totally expunged from usage. Under the pretext of combating what is called local nationalism, there is persecution and destruction of national cadres

and local intelligentsia, with all the command posts being filled by Chinese.

In its foreign policy towards its immediate neighbours, Peking has been pursuing a similarly chauvinistic line, bristling with scorn for the national dignity of other peoples. An example is the anti-Mongolian campaign, the Maoists' contemptuous attitude to the people of Burma, the repeated threats against Nepal and the security of India, and numerous other hostile Maoist acts against other countries.

Mao's followers ignore the Chinese Communists' historical ties with the international communist movement. A look at the Chinese writings on the history of the CPC shows quite clearly their desire to present the whole of the CPC's activity in isolation from the international communist and working-class movement, which gave the Chinese revolution so much help on its way to victory. A book by Miao Chu-huang, entitled *A Short History of the Communist Party of China*, like other writings, mentions the Comintern only when dealing with the periods before Mao's take-over. From the time Mao became head of the Party nothing is said about the Comintern's role in fighting Right-opportunism and Leftist adventurism in China, about the Comintern's correct strategy and tactics in the Chinese revolution, or the turn carried out by the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, a direct result of which was the CPC's proclamation of a united national anti-Japanese front.

Mao's "Resolution on Some Questions of Our Party's History" does not contain the slightest hint that there is an international communist movement, and ascribes to Mao all the political

propositions of the Comintern, which were justified in the course of the revolution in China and which played such a role in its victory.

While saying nothing of the Comintern's role, Mao dared not in the early stages ignore the importance for the victory of the Chinese revolution of the Soviet Union's assistance and of the consequences of the defeat of fascism in the Second World War. In June 1949, he wrote: "Let us think about this. But for the existence of the Soviet Union, but for the victory against fascism in the Second World War, but for the rout of Japanese imperialism, but for the emergence of the people's democracies, but for the rise to struggle of the oppressed peoples of the East, but for the popular struggle in the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and other capitalist countries against the ruling reactionary cliques in these countries, but for the combination of all these factors, the forces of international reaction looming above our heads would of course have been we don't know how many more times greater than they are today. Could we have won in those circumstances? Of course not. Even if we had won, we could not have consolidated our victory."

However, very soon anything that gave a reminder of international solidarity with the Chinese people was eradicated.

In 1959, on the tenth anniversary of the People's Republic of China, a museum of the People's Liberation Army was opened in Peking in a spacious specially erected building. Its numerous exhibits re-enact in detail the struggle for the country's liberation, and most stridently extol Chairman Mao's "military genius."

However, it is not only what is there, but also what is not there that makes this museum remarkable. Visitors to the museum will never learn about the broad international working-class movement which called for "Hands off China!", the numerous manifestations of solidarity by the working people of the world with the Chinese people, and assistance to it in its struggle.

No effort is made to recall what Mao wrote in August 1945 about the Soviet Army's invaluable assistance and the vast quantities of weapons handed over to the People's Liberation Army by the Soviet Command after the defeat of Japan, something that created the necessary conditions for the successful completion of the Chinese revolution.

The Maoists began by hushing up the international solidarity and the Soviet Union's role in the victory of the revolution in China and went on to denigrate Soviet economic assistance. Intolerable conditions were created for the Soviet specialists who were working at the numerous construction sites and who were helping to reconstruct various enterprises. They were harassed, demonstratively ignored, provoked in every way so that the Soviet Union was forced to recall them. The Maoists then started a slanderous campaign accusing the USSR of having abandoned economic co-operation with China. Very soon the equipment arriving from the Soviet Union in China was being stripped of "Made in USSR" labels. Nothing was to give a reminder of the Soviet people's role in boosting China's economy.

The Communist Parties of many countries have experienced for themselves the practical meaning

of the Maoists' claims to speak on behalf of other peoples. The results of the application of "Chinese experience" by Communists in some Asian countries are well known. Without a broad peasant movement in these countries, their parties tried to start armed struggle without massive support and found themselves isolated from the people. There were tragic consequences for the Communist Party of Indonesia when its leadership adopted the line Peking was imposing. One of Asia's largest Communist Parties suffered the heaviest defeat; hundreds of thousands of Communists were savagely killed.

Let us recall that Lenin had always warned against any mechanical application of Russia's experience to other conditions, and had always urged a creative application only of that which constituted the truly fundamental basis of the experience of the October Revolution. Mao and his group have claimed that their country's way is a compulsory model for the rest of the world, or at any rate for the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Marxist-Leninist historical science and philosophy have always resolutely opposed any bourgeois concepts setting up Europe as the centre of the world. But the Marxist view of the general regularities governing the advance of world history and respect for each nation's contribution to the treasure-house of world culture is obviously not to the liking of the Maoists, who readily accept the nationalistic methodology of the Europe-centre conception, for European "centrism" is easily supplanted by Asian "centrism," and it requires no great sleight of hand to supplant the latter by Chinese "centrism". Racist conceptions

of world history are gaining ever greater currency in China. Encouragement is being given, for instance, to this explanation of how the period of modern history opened: "The leading position of the people of the yellow race from Asia was firmly seized by the people of the white race from Europe." That, the Maoists insist, is what caused mankind countless calamities.

For a number of years now, all things Chinese have been exalted in China, the purpose being to bring out the unique role played by the yellow race in world civilisation. The Chinese press has been trying very hard to prove that when "the present so-called civilised nations were still chasing wild beasts in the forests, China already had a high level of civilisation," and that everything in China was "classic," so that even her slave system had anticipated those of Greece and Rome. America was "discovered" by the Chinese 1,400 years before Columbus. The glorification of things Chinese goes hand in hand with the running down of all things foreign, and an urge to keep the foreigners at arm's length by erecting another Great Wall and making territorial claims on neighbouring countries. Great Han Sino-centrism is becoming the official principle for the interpretation of world history.

Anything that does not fit within the new stereotyped evaluation is discarded and new schemes are hastily produced for the needs of chauvinist ideology and racism. Not long ago Chinese historians used to say that the Mongol yoke had been bloody and devastating and had done great damage to Chinese society; Genghis Khan was an "aggressor outdone by very few in mankind's history." Now, Genghis Khan is presented as a

kind of Kulturträger, because it turns out that "his steeds broke through the iron walls of 40 big and small states in which the peoples had been confined." Of course, the destruction of 40 states could not have taken place without bloodshed and ruin, but what is that compared with the fact that the conquered peoples "got to know a higher civilisation from which they could learn."

There was a time when the imperialist penetration of the East was accompanied by an inflation of white racism. This was epitomised by Rudyard Kipling during the imperial fervour of the late 19th century, when he wrote:

East is East and West is West
And never the twain shall meet.

The internationalist ideology of the working class exposed the racist ideology of imperialist aggrandisement. The progressive forces in all countries denounce racism, apartheid and genocide.

Mao has made imperialist, racist mottoes serve his own great-power aims and ambitions. Like Kipling, Mao says that East and West shall never meet. In fact, he insists that today "the wind from the East prevails over the wind from the West."

Mao has not attacked the imperialist countries or exposed Israel as a tool in the hands of American and British imperialism; he has tried to range the Arabs against the West in general, including in the latter the socialist countries, which are a real bulwark for Arab national independence.

It is becoming increasingly clear that the world revolution about which the Maoists have been

making so much noise is nothing but a plan to realise Peking's great-Han aspirations.

Never before has adventurism camouflaged with revolutionary talk presented such a danger as today, when it has become the official ideology of the ruling group of the world's most populous country. What is now happening in China is not only a tragedy for her own people, but a great loss for the international communist movement and all the liberation forces of our day. Never before has anti-communism been given such an ideological prop as the Mao group is giving it; never before has anyone dealt such a blow at socialist ideals as the Maoists are now doing.

Who stands to gain from extremist Maoist-type action became evident once again during the events in France in the spring of 1968. The foundations of the regime were shaken by a vast well-organised strike involving nine million working people. But the ruling forces managed to consolidate their positions, and to do so precisely with the aid of Maoist, Trotskyite and anarchist groups. Their provocations and outrages created an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty, and the authorities made skilful use of this. No wonder, the bourgeois press wrote that if the ultra-revolutionary groups in France did not exist, it would be necessary to invent them.

Lenin assessed the forms of struggle not from an abstract stand of what was more revolutionary, but of how well these forms accorded with the objective conditions of the struggle by living

social forces and helped to extend the mass movement and raise it to a higher level. Lenin stressed that the Bolsheviks could not and would never issue the slogan of "being more revolutionary than everyone else," and that they found the perverted and absurd tactics of anarchism which "made" revolutions to be deeply abhorrent.

The most revolutionary slogan which seems to call for the most resolute forms of struggle inevitably becomes an empty shell if it is proclaimed regardless of the given stage and the actually existing forms of movement. Lenin wrote that it was harmful "when people refused to reckon with the actual situation that has arisen and the actual conditions of the particular mass movement, because of a slogan misinterpreted as unchangeable. Such an application of a slogan inevitably degenerates into revolutionary phrasemongering."¹

There have never been and there can never be any universal forms of struggle applicable to any situation. What may appear to have been the only possible way and what had indeed played a revolutionary role in one set of conditions may well become anti-revolutionary in a different situation. On the other hand, what had looked like abandonment of the revolutionary struggle may become the most important form of struggle for the revolution in a different historical situation.

Anti-communism has many faces and subtle methods of fighting the forces of progress. But one thing stands out in this diversity: since the emergence of scientific communism its enemies have maliciously ascribed to Communists words

¹ Lenin. *Coll. Works*, Vol. 15, p. 215.

and deeds which have nothing in common with communism and which could merely discredit the radiant ideals of socialism.

In their *Communist Manifesto*, Marx and Engels exposed the absurd and base accusations that the Communists were allegedly intent on abolishing all personal property and even the family, that they wanted to introduce the community of women, and so on. The bourgeoisie has always sought to present the ideas of "barrack-room communism" and the terroristic methods of the petty-bourgeois revolutionists as being those of the Marxists.

All present-day anti-communist writings portray Trotskyism as "classic Marxism," and make wide use of Trotskyite ideas to slander the communist ideology.

The traditional anti-communist method is to try to pass distortions of socialism and violations of its principles and rules for socialism, and petty-bourgeois revolutionariness, for Marxism-Leninism. A vast propaganda machine is being maintained to play up any deviation from true socialism, and to invent and inflate them in every way when there are none.

Today, instead of trying to scare the working people with their own inventions, the anti-Communists merely report the practices in China, making a point of stressing that that is the system the Communists want to install, and that the same thing will happen wherever the Communists take over.

The international communist movement has been developing on the basis of a joint struggle by all the Parties for their common aims, abiding by the principle of independence of each Party

and non-interference in each other's affairs. But just as the successes and achievements of one Party tend to multiply the strength of the whole movement, so the distortions and the trampling of jointly worked-out principles and decisions by any one Party, especially that of a big country, inflict painful blows on other Parties as well.

The struggle for socialism throughout the world demands unity of the Communist and Workers' Parties on the principled basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. The Mao group's subversive activity in the international communist movement weakens the revolutionary forces. At the same time, all those who cherish communist ideals feel a greater urge to unite, and this creates the prerequisites for stronger unity.

The Marxist-Leninists do not believe that sincere and honest revolutionaries will be found only in their own ranks. They are happy to greet all fighters against imperialism, regardless of whether or not they accept Marxist views. The Communists reject the fanatical sectarianism of the Maoists, who recognise as revolutionaries only those who worship their idol.

But Marxism says that parties and individuals must be judged not by their own image of themselves, or by the public image they project, but by their deeds. To be revolutionary today is to fight imperialism, the main barrier in the way of mankind's progressive development, and all those who hamper this struggle and split the ranks of the anti-imperialist front place themselves outside the revolutionary ranks, however loud their cover-up talk may be.

Lenin, the immortal genius of our revolutionary

epoch, has gone down in history as an implacable fighter against imperialism and reaction, who stood for joint action by all the anti-imperialist forces. Lenin was a consistent internationalist, a champion of equality and of peace and friendship among nations, who bitterly denounced any manifestations of racism and chauvinism. Lenin was a friend of all the oppressed nations, who opened up the victorious way in the struggle against colonialism, for the independence and freedom of nations, and for their right to decide their own future.

The International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties solemnly declared that the Communists would always be true to the creative spirit of Leninism, and that this bound them to fight against the Right and Left-opportunist distortions of theory and politics, against revisionism, dogmatism and against Left-sectarian adventurism.

Б. МЕРИНСОН

АНАРХИЗМ, ТРОЦКИЗМ, МАОИЗМ

на английском языке

Цена 37 коп

